A Mild Winter: The Status of Environmental Preliminary
Injunctions
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Since the enactment of environmental legislation in the 1970s, the
preliminary injunction standard articulated by the Supreme Court for environmental claims has evolved from general principles to enumerated
factors. In Winter v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., the Court’s
most recent refinement, the Court endorsed but failed to explain the application of a common four-factor test when it held that the alleged injury
to marine mammals was outweighed by the public interest of a welltrained and prepared Navy.1 While a number of commentators have
speculated about Winter’s impact on future environmental preliminary
injunctions, this article seeks to more precisely determine Winter’s effect. It does so by providing a quantitative and qualitative analysis of
data collected from federal district and circuit courts three years before
and three years after Winter.
This data demonstrates that not only has the number of injunctions
granted and denied stayed relatively consistent but most trial courts have
not altered their approach to environmental preliminary injunction requests. Instead, they continue to look to their circuit court rather than the
U.S. Supreme Court for guidance when reviewing these requests. Several
circuit courts have addressed Winter, and apart from the Fourth Circuit,
these circuits reconciled Winter with their earlier preliminary injunction
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standard. Thus, while Winter’s effect is significant in form, it is mild in
substance.
INTRODUCTION
The motion for preliminary injunction is a popular tool used by environmental plaintiffs.2 While the factors used to evaluate preliminary
injunctions have been established for some time, the application of these
factors has varied.3 The “dizzying diversity of [preliminary injunction]
formulations”4 resulted in “confusion”5 among courts.6 In the environmental context,7 one scholar recently remarked that “the supply of [preliminary injunctions] is notoriously uneven, subject to misappropriation,
and of a perennially-questioned legal pedigree.”8 Judges have called for a
“uniform federal standard,”9 and scholars have requested “order of a doc-

2. Sierra Club v. Espy, 822 F. Supp. 356, 362 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (noting that preliminary injunctions are “[t]he most common form of remedy sought by citizens suing federal agencies in environmental cases”).
3. See, e.g., Bethany M. Bates, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard for Preliminary
Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522, 1552 (2011) (arguing for uniformity in
granting preliminary injunctions to prevent “inconsistent and inequitable decisions”); Morton
Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REV.
LITIG. 495, 497 (2003) (“‘[C]onfusion persists’ regarding which standard should apply for granting
or denying the preliminary injunction motion.”).
4. John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 526
(1978).
5. See Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting the “confusion” that surrounds the “four-part preliminary injunction standard”).
6. Linda J. Silberman, Injunctions by the Numbers: Less Than the Sum of Its Parts, 63 CHI.KENT L. REV. 279, 279 (1987) (stating “[t]he law on standards for granting or denying preliminary
injunctions has never been a model of clarity”).
7. For purposes of this Article, I have focused on “environmental” preliminary injunctions. I
agree with those environmental law scholars who argue that environmental injury is different from
other types of injury because environmental injury cannot be remedied with money damages and can
span time and space. “Environmental law” is distinct from other areas of the law, and therefore,
environmental cases should be treated differently from other types of cases. For a detailed discussion
on the uniqueness of environmental law, see Richard J. Lazarus, Resorting What’s Environmental
About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 706–07 (2000); see also
Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL
L. REV. 221, 282 (2010) (advocating for a use-conflict framework to conceptualize environmental
law as a distinct legal field). But cf., Jay D. Wexler, The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 260, 261 n.11, (2006) (arguing that environmental law is a subset of administrative law rather than a radically unique or distinct area of law).
8. Jamison E. Colburn, The Cynic at the Circus, 45 TULSA L. REV. 307, 321–22 (2009).
9. See Denlow, supra note 3, at 533.
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trine applied in so many disparate settings.”10 Winter is one of several
recent Supreme Court decisions that attempt to clarify this doctrine.11
Before Winter, the Court had three opportunities to articulate a clear
preliminary injunction standard and a clear application of this standard
for alleged violations of environmental statutes.12 In each decision, the
Court relied on general principles instead of a precise formula when reviewing the injunction request.13 In Winter, the Court refined these earlier decisions and, for the first time, endorsed a four-factor test for preliminary injunctions: “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”14 Thus, the Court clarified the relevant preliminary injunction factors in environmental cases.15 In particular, the Court reinvigorated the
public interest factor, a factor that had effectively fallen by the way side,
and cast doubt on but did not eliminate a flexible application of all four
factors.16
Even before Winter most lower courts agreed that four factors
should be evaluated as part of an injunction request.17 What courts struggled with and what the Court in Winter failed to fully explain was the
application of these factors.18 For example, should all factors have the
same weight? Should certain factors be considered threshold factors? Do
all factors need to be evaluated? Because the Court failed to describe
10. David Schoenbrod, The Immortality of Equitable Balancing, 96 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 17,
21 (2010) (noting that it would be a “worthwhile endeavor” for “law professors to” “help the court”
in this way).
11. See Anthony DiSarro, Freeze Frame: The Supreme Court’s Reaffirmation of the Substantive Principles of Preliminary Injunctions, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 51, 83 (2012) (identifying five recent
Supreme Court decisions, including Winter, that show “the Supreme Court is clearly unwilling to
permit lower federal courts to alter the traditional standards for assessing whether preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate”); Rachel A. Weisshaar, Hazy Shades of Winter: Resolving the Circuit
Split over Preliminary Injunctions, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1016 (2012) (identifying three recent
Supreme Court decisions, including Winter, that “provide new clues as to which preliminary injunction test the Court prefers”).
12. See infra Part I.
13. Id.
14. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 19 (2008). In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), the Supreme Court endorsed a similar four-part test for
permanent injunctions.
15. Colburn, supra note 8, at 322 (stating that in Winter, “[t]he Supreme Court (finally) explicitly endorsed [a] four-factored test, perhaps even turning the four factors into elements”).
16. See infra Part III.
17. See cases in Appendix.
18. See infra Part I; see also Morton Denlow, Preliminary Injunctions: Look Before You Leap,
28 LITIG. 2, 3 (2002) (explaining up to four different standards used by circuit courts, and therefore
trial courts, and noting that “[t]he standard can greatly impact the result”).
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how the four factors relate to each other or to the greater purposes of a
preliminary injunction,19 Winter failed to answer the more pressing question: how should a trial court apply these factors?
Consequently, Winter’s significance has been debated. Some commentators predicted that because of its unique facts and narrow holding,
Winter’s applicability would be limited to only those injunction requests
involving homeland security or military preparedness.20 Others criticized
Winter for creating a higher preliminary injunction standard by raising
the bar for a requisite showing of irreparable harm,21 most likely making
it more difficult for environmental plaintiffs to succeed in their future
requests for preliminary injunctions.22 Courts too have characterized the
Winter standard as being “more rigorous.”23
Assessing these concerns requires an understanding of earlier Court
precedent addressing environmental preliminary injunctions. Many
19. See Bates, supra note 3, at 1552, 1553. The author explains that the sliding-scale analysis
survives Winter because “contemporary Supreme Court cases also support the use of the sliding
scale approach.” Id. at 1552. Winter merely held that “only showing a ‘possibility’ of irreparable
harm was not enough” to obtain a preliminary injunction but “failed to comment on whether courts
could use a sliding scale analysis or whether a movant could be granted a preliminary injunction
based on a showing that there are serious questions going to the merits.” Id. at 1523.
20. See William S. Eubanks II, Damage Done? The Status of NEPA After Winter v. NRDC and
Answers to Lingering Questions Left Open by the Court, 33 VT. L. REV. 649, 658 (2009) (“Based on
its narrow holding on equitable balancing grounds, it is clear that the Court perceived Winter as a
case predominantly about the public’s interest in military preparedness and less about environmental
protection under NEPA.”); see also Stephen M. Johnson, The Roberts Court and the Environment,
37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 317, 343 (2010) (stating that “the Winter Court focused heavily on the
importance of military readiness in its opinion, so the decision might be limited to disputes arising in
similar contexts in the future”).
21. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Court Sets Higher Hurdle for Preliminary Injunctions, 45 TRIAL
58, 59 (Jan. 2009) (describing the Supreme Court’s approach as “strict”); see also Benjamin I. Narodick, Winter v. National Resources Defense Council: Going into the Belly of the Whale of Preliminary Injunctions and Environmental Law, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 332, 342 (2009) (calling the
standard in Winter a “newly intensified standards for obtaining a preliminary injunction”); John C.
Stellakis, U.S. Navy Torpedoes NEPA: Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council May Sink
Future Environmental Pleas Brought Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 21 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 353, 378 (2010) (“The Court also expressly set, and arguably raised, the bar for a requisite showing of irreparable harm to obtain a preliminary injunction for NEPA actions.”).
22. Nate Hausman, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms: Breathing a Sigh of Equitable
Relief, 25 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 155, 182–83 (2011) (“Post-Winter courts will undoubtedly be more
reluctant to issue injunctions.”); William Krueger, In the Navy: The Future Strength of Preliminary
Injunctions Under NEPA in Light of NRDC v. Winter, 10 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 423, 443 (2009) (“This
new, formulaic rubric for the issuance of an injunction removes much of the flexibility that has historically been the ‘hallmark of equity jurisdiction,’ and will likely lead to a reduced number of injunctions in environmental enforcement actions.” (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 50 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))).
23. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Locke, No. 1:09-cv-01053, 2010 WL 500455, at
*2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2010); see also RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208–09 (10th Cir.
2009) (noting that the movant seeking a mandatory preliminary injunction after Winter is required
“to make a heightened showing of the four factors”).
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scholars believe that these earlier decisions created a more lenient standard unique to environmental plaintiffs.24 They argue that Winter has
somehow disrupted the existing standard for environmental plaintiffs.25
Environmental practitioners have a similar perspective: Winter has “had
a stifling effect” on environmental plaintiffs.26 Many environmental organizations have abandoned the preliminary injunction route because
“Winter has implicitly raised the bar.”27
Absent from this discussion, however, is any study evaluating
whether, post-Winter, the preliminary injunction standard is more stringent and whether courts are more reluctant to issue injunctions. A more
fundamental question is whether post-Winter trial courts approach environmental preliminary injunctions differently.
This Article explores these questions through an analysis of quantitative and qualitative data collected from federal district and circuit
courts three years before and three years after Winter. The quantitative
analysis counts the number of environmental injunctions granted, denied,
or granted in part and denied in part during this time, while the qualitative analysis evaluates the content of the judicial decisions focusing on
the preliminary injunction standard cited and the manner in which the
preliminary injunction factors are evaluated.
In Part I, the Article begins by tracing the evolution of the environmental preliminary injunction standard from general principles to the
precise four-factor preliminary injunction standard articulated in Winter.
Part II describes the Winter decision and highlights concerns from academics about the Winter decision and its application by trial courts. Part
III explains the study designed to evaluate changes in the environmental
preliminary injunction standard in light of Winter’s pronouncement of a
four-factor standard and presents the qualitative and quantitative results
of this study. Part IV then provides an assessment of these results. Part V
concludes.
24. Eubanks, supra note 20, at 658 (“[I]nterpretations of NEPA’s unique statutory scheme and
purpose resulted in more lenient irreparable harm analyses in the post-Gambell judicial arena.”); see
also Sarah Axtell, Reframing the Judicial Approach to Injunctive Relief for Environmental Plaintiffs
in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 317, 328 (2011) (“For a long time,
environmental plaintiffs enjoyed strong injunctive relief as a protection from environmental harm.”).
25. See Hausman, supra note 22, at 182–83 (“Post-Winter courts will undoubtedly be more
reluctant to issue injunctions for NEPA violations than before.”).
26. Email from Professor Jack Tuholske, Visiting Professor of Law, Dir. of Water & Justice,
Vermont Law Sch. to Sarah J. Morath, Assistant Professor of Legal Writing, Univ. of Akron Sch. of
Law (Nov. 11, 2012) (on file with author).
27. Id.; see also John E. McCann, Jr., Evolving State and Federal Court Injunction Standards,
44 MD. B.J. 48, 48 (Jan./Feb. 2011) (explaining that under the Winter standard, “obtaining a preliminary injunction in the Fourth Circuit . . . is now much more difficult”). Mr. McCann is an assistant
practice group leader and principal at the law firm Miles & Stockbridge P.C. in Baltimore, MD.
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Briefly, the quantitative data suggests little change. Injunctions
overall were denied 51.5% of the time pre-Winter, compared to 53.6% of
the time post-Winter. Injunction requests under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the most commonly used environmental statute, were denied 53.6% of the time pre-Winter compared to 55.1% of the
time post-Winter. Similarly, the qualitative data shows little change in
the injunction standard used by trial courts post-Winter. Trial courts continue to look to their circuit court for guidance on what standard to apply.
Seven circuit courts (the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth,
and Tenth) have addressed their standard, either implicitly or explicitly,
in light of Winter, and of these circuits, only the Fourth Circuit has expressly held that Winter invalidates its earlier standard.28
Given the disconnect between what scholars argue, what environmental practitioners perceive, and what the quantitative and qualitative
data demonstrate, perhaps the full effects of Winter have not yet
emerged. Scholars and practitioners agree that the preliminary injunction
standard is at a crossroads,29 and Winter is unlikely to be the final word
on preliminary injunctions.30 In the absence of further clarification from
the Court, this article offers a starting point for discussing the appropriate
preliminary injunction standard for environmental cases. The time is ripe
for discussing the appropriate standard for preliminary injunctions generally,31 environmental injunctions more specifically, the role of statutes in
evaluating the injunction request,32 and the interrelationship between the
four preliminary injunction factors. 33
28. The First, Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have not yet weighed in on the validity
of their earlier standards in light of Winter. See infra Part III.
29. See Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 204 (2012) (“The law of equitable remedies is the in
midst of an American revolution.”).
30. See Paul W. Conable & Frank J. Weiss, Surviving Winter: The Ninth Circuit Reaffirms the
“Serious Questions” Test for Injunctive Relief, 30 OR. ST. BAR LITIG. J. 15, 19 (2011), available at
http://www.osblitigation.com/lj2011-fall.pdf (concluding that “it is possible that further guidance
from the Supreme Court will be forthcoming on this issue”).
31. Schoenbrod, supra note 10, at 21 (noting that it would be a “worthwhile endeavor” for law
professors to “help the court” by “mak[ing] order of a doctrine applied in so many disparate settings”).
32. Compare Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV.
485, 488 (2010) (arguing that “equitable balancing in statutory cases should be abandoned because it
conflicts with separation of powers principles”), with Schoenbrod, supra note 10, at 18 (disagreeing
with Goldstein’s premise that “equitable balancing inevitably gives judges open-ended discretion to
reach whatever result makes sense to them”).
33. Commentators in several recent articles have suggested different applications of the Winter
standard. See DiSarro, supra note 11, at 90–98 (arguing for a “freeze frame” approach that requires
proof of both a likelihood of success and irreparable injury); Weisshaar, supra note 11, at 1048
(arguing that the Supreme Court should adopt a sequential tests and use a serious-questions test in
narrow circumstances); see also Bates, supra note, 3 at 1523 (arguing that all district courts should
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
The Winter appeal was not the first time the Court evaluated a preliminary injunction arising from a violation of an environmental statute.
With the enactment of environmental statutes in the early 1970s, an era
of citizen enforcement of environmental statutes followed.34 Injunctive
relief quickly became the most common form of remedy sought by citizens suing federal agencies in an environmental case.35 In such cases, a
court would balance the potential harms to each party before deciding
whether to enjoin the challenged conduct.36 Through citizen enforcement actions, the Court issued a series of decisions addressing environmental preliminary injunctions: Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, and Amoco Production Company v. Village of Gambell.
These cases, however, discuss when a court should engage in equitable balancing rather than how a court should perform such balancing.
Thus, while the Court identified when equitable balancing was appropriate and the constitutional limits to a trial court’s equitable discretion
when statutory violations were alleged, it failed to articulate a “coherent
theory” for determining remedies in such instances.37 In addition, the
Court described preliminary injunctions more generally as a remedy that
involves “commonplace considerations” and “well-established principles,” never fully defining or explaining how these considerations or
principles relate to each other.38

“incorporate a sliding scale analysis that weighs the four factors against one another”); Kevin J.
Lynch, The Lock-in Effect of Preliminary Injunctions (forthcoming) (on file with author) (proposing
a flexible preliminary injunction standard requiring only “serious questions” on the merits).
34. See Zygmut J.B. Plater, Environmental Law and Three Economies: Navigating a Sprawling
Field of Study, Practice, and Societal Governance in Which Everything Is Connected to Everything
Else, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 361 (1999) (The “first Earth Day galvanized a cadre of attorneys, law teachers, law students, and citizens to begin integrating the lessons of environmental
awareness into the legal system . . . .”); see also Zygmut J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, A Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
981, 983 (1994) (“[E]nvironmental law has developed its complex, extended, doctrinal structure in a
process dependent upon confrontational, pluralistic citizen activism, operating in every area of governance, but particularly in judicial and administrative litigation.”).
35. See Michael D. Axline, Constitutional Implications of Injunctive Relief Against Federal
Agencies in Environmental Cases, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988).
36. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944) (stating that the court “balances the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to them according as they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction” (citation omitted)).
37. See Axline, supra note 35 (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation and application of
equitable discretion and the separation of powers in these three decisions).
38. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (using the phrase “common place
considerations”); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531(1987) (using the phrase “wellestablished principles”).
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Because the Court applied these considerations and principles without much discussion, courts were left with little guidance. Lower courts
were free to evaluate preliminary injunctions flexibly, emphasizing those
considerations and principles they deemed most important.39 Not surprisingly, confusion and inconsistency emerged.40
A. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill and the Limits to
Equitable Balancing
Interestingly, the most well-known decision addressing an environmental preliminary injunction, 41 Tenneesee Valley Authority v. Hill,42
is known more for its discussion of statutory interpretation than equitable
balancing.43 In that case, environmental groups sought to enjoin the actions of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) using the Endangered
Species Act (ESA).44 TVA had almost completed a multi-million dollar
hydroelectric project, the construction of the Tellico Dam, when a threeinch fish, the snail darter, was discovered in an area that “would be completely inundated by the reservoir created as a consequence of the Tellico
Dam’s completion,”45 thereby destroying the snail darter’s habitat.46 Because the snail darter was a listed endangered species, its habitat was
protected under Section 7 the ESA.47 Using Section 11(g) of the ESA,48
an environmental group sought “to [permanently] enjoin completion of
the dam and impoundment of the reservoir” arguing that those actions
would violate the ESA by directly causing the extinction of the snail
darter.49 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee denied the request, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals re-

39. See DiSarro, supra note 11, at 75 (discussing three modifications made by federal appellate
courts to the preliminary injunction standard).
40. Axline, supra note 35, at 34; see also Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 526 (noting a “dizzying
diversity of formulations”).
41. See Michael R. Lozeau, Preliminary Injunctions and the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act: The Clean Water Permit Program as a Limitation on the Courts’ Equitable Discretion, 42
RUTGERS L. REV. 701, 712 (1990) (calling Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill “a landmark decision in environmental law”).
42. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) [hereinafter TVA].
43. See J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act’s Fall from Grace in the Supreme Court, 36
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 487, 498 (2012) (noting that the “central dispute” in TVA involved a “battle
of statutory interpretation” between the majority and dissent).
44. TVA, 437 U.S. at 156.
45. Id. at 161.
46. Id. at 162.
47. Id.
48. Section 11(g) of the ESA allows “any person” to bring a civil action to “enjoin any person
including the United States . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of the Act.” 16
U.S.C. § 1536.
49. TVA, 437 U.S. at 164.
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versed this decision explaining “that the District Court had abused its
discretion by not issuing an injunction in the face of ‘a blatant statutory
violation.’”50
On appeal, the Supreme Court analyzed two questions: whether
completing the dam would violate the ESA; and, if there was a violation
of the Act, whether an injunction was the appropriate remedy.51 To answer the first question, the Court spent considerable time examining the
language, history, and structure of the ESA and concluded “beyond a
doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the
highest of priorities,”52 and “[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting
this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost.”53 The Court explained that “[t]he repeated expressions of congressional concern” over the eradication of endangered species “suggest how the balance would have been struck had the issue been
presented to Congress in 1973.”54 Thus, the Court concluded that completion of the dam would violate the ESA.55
Having determined that the operation of the Tellico Dam would violate the ESA, the Court turned to the second question, the requested
remedy: an injunction. TVA requested that the Court simply issue a remedy “that accords with some modicum of common sense and the public
weal.”56 In response, the Court explained that general “principles,” instead of “common sense and the public weal,” determine the appropriate
remedy.57 One such principle is that a “federal judge sitting as a chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of the law.”58 Additionally, while in most cases “the balancing of
equities and hardships is appropriate,”59 these principles “take a court
only so far.”60
The Court recognized the intrinsic limits of a tripartite system of
government and explained that “[o]nce Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the
Executive to administer the laws and for the courts to enforce them when

50. Id. at 168 (citing the Sixth Circuit’s decision).
51. Id. at 172.
52. Id. at 174.
53. Id. at 184.
54. Id. at 186.
55. Id. at 193 (“[T]here is an irreconcilable conflict between operations of the Tellico Dam and
the explicit provisions of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act . . . .”).
56. Id. at 194.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 193.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 194.
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enforcement is sought.”61 Although the Court noted that the burden on
the public through the loss of millions of dollars could greatly outweigh
the loss of the snail darter, the Court did not have the authority to make
such a decision, stating “emphatically” that it did not “[have] the power
to engage in such a weighing process.”62 Because Congress had already
decided through the enactment of the ESA that the scales of equity tipped
in favor of the endangered species, the snail darter, the Court did not balance any “equities and hardships” and simply affirmed the decision to
grant the injunction.63
Since this decision, many courts have interpreted TVA v. Hill as
foreclosing equitable balancing in ESA cases and have refused to engage
in equitable balancing when an injunction request alleges a violation of
the ESA.64 Others have determined that an alternative preliminary injunction standard applies to injunction requests under the ESA.65 Some
scholars, too, have described the TVA v. Hill decision as either “explicitly
preclud[ing] courts from engaging in traditional equitable balancing in
determining whether to issue an injunction in the face of a violation of
the Act”66 or requiring a different standard.67 TVA v. Hill may be useful
to trial court judges confronted with the occasional injunction request
alleging an ESA violation; however, in terms of analyzing a preliminary
injunction based on a violation of NEPA or some other environmental
statute, TVA v. Hill’s usefulness is limited.
First, because the Court did not engage in equitable balancing, TVA
v. Hill did not give federal courts any guidance on how to apply the general preliminary injunction principles it discussed. In addition, although
61. Id.
62. Id. at 187–88.
63. Id. at 194. (“Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that
the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities, thereby
adopting a policy which it described as ‘institutionalized caution.’” (citation omitted)).
64. Federico Cheever, Butterflies, Cave Spiders, Milk-Vetch, Bunchgrass, Sedge, Lilies,
Checker-Mallows and Why the Prohibition Against Judicial Balancing of Harm Under the Endangered Species Act Is a Good Idea, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 313, 316 (1998); see
also Patrick Parenteau, Citizen Suits Under the Endangered Species Act: Survival of the Fittest, 10
WIDENER L. REV. 321, 333–34 (2004) (describing cases where district courts have explained that the
public interest favors the imposition of an injunction in ESA cases).
65. See infra Part III (discussing the different standard used with injunctions brought under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA)).
66. See Cheever, supra note 64, at 316; but see Brandon M. Middleton, Restoring Tradition:
The Inapplicability of TVA v. Hill’s Endangered Species Act Injunctive Relief Standard to Preliminary Injunctive Relief of Non-Federal Actors, 17 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 318 (2010) (arguing
for a more narrow interpretation of the ESA).
67. See Cheever, supra note 64, at 314 (“[T]he orthodoxy [of TVA] makes sense. The Endangered Species Act . . . cannot tolerate judicial balancing of species harm and economic dislocation
while still honoring the purpose of the statute-the preservation and recovery of protected species and
the ecosystems on which they depend.”); see also Parenteau, supra note 64, at 333–34.
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the Court noted the separation of powers in injunction cases, some scholar’s argue it did not provide a coherent theory for when a court’s equitable powers may be limited.68 Sensing that this decision may lead environmental plaintiffs to argue that the traditional rules of equitable balancing do not apply when statutory violations are alleged, the Court clearly
distinguished TVA v. Hill the next time it addressed an environmental
preliminary injunction.
B. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo and Commonplace Considerations
The next Supreme Court decision involving environmental injunctive relief reviewed the limits to a court’s equitable discretion and further
discussed the “commonplace considerations” of a court when reviewing
injunction requests. Decided in 1982, a few years after TVA v. Hill,
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo69 involved the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA), which is now the Clean Water Act (CWA). Under both versions of the Act, facilities must obtain a national pollution
discharge elimination system (NPDES) permit from the Environmental
Protection Agency before discharging a pollutant, which the Navy had
failed to do.70 Environmental plaintiffs, using the citizen suit provision of
the FWPCA, sued the Navy for unpermitted discharges.71 Characterizing
the Navy’s conduct as “technical violations” that were not causing any
“appreciable harm” to the environment, the United States District Court
for the District of Puerto Rico denied the injunction but ordered the Navy
to apply for a NPDES permit.72 Relying on TVA v. Hill and the position
that a clear violation of a statute required injunctive relief, the First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the order and remanded with instructions
for the Navy to cease the violation until it obtained a permit.73 On appeal,
the Supreme Court considered whether the district court was required to
issue an injunction given the Navy’s failure to comply with the permit
requirements of the FWPCA or retained discretion to issue other relief.74
As in TVA, the Court noted the limits Congress may place on a
court’s equitable discretion but cautioned that the Court should not
“lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established
principles,”75 including the principle that a court is not “mechanically
68. See Axline, supra note 35, at 34 (stating that these three decisions failed “to develop clear
rules of decision for federal courts to apply in later cases”).
69. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
70. Id. at 308.
71. Id. at 307–08.
72. Id. at 309–10.
73. Id. at 310.
74. Id. at 306–07.
75. Id. at 313 (citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)).
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obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of the law.”76 Although the violation of the FWPCA statute was clear, unlike TVA v. Hill,
the Court considered the failure to get a permit a procedural rather than a
substantive violation.77 Furthermore, the Court noted that the purpose
and language of the ESA, and not the bare fact of a statutory violation,
prevented equitable balancing and compelled the injunction of the dam in
TVA.78
Thus, the Court evaluated FWPCA’s “scheme and purpose” to determine whether equitable discretion was foreclosed.79 First, the Court
noted that unlike the ESA, FWPCA had other means, apart from an injunction, to ensure compliance, including a provision for fines and criminal penalties.80 Second, the Court emphasized that the purpose of the
FWPCA was to maintain “[t]he integrity of the Nation’s waters, . . . not
the permit process.”81 Upon receipt of the NPDES permit, the Navy
would be in compliance with the FWPCA. The permitting program thus
“contemplates the exercise of discretion and balancing of equities militates against the conclusion that Congress intended to deny courts their
traditional equitable discretion in enforcing the statute.”82 A final aspect
of the statutory scheme that suggested courts retained their traditional
equitable discretion was the statute’s “phased compliance.”83 The
“scheme of phased compliance” further suggested that FWPCA, unlike
ESA, was a statute in which Congress “envisioned, rather than curtailed,
the exercise of discretion.”84
Based on the Court’s interpretation of the statutory scheme and
purpose of FWPCA, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that procedural violations of environmental statutes gave rise to automatic injunctions.85 Instead, it interpreted FWPCA as not “foreclosing complete-

76. Id. at 313.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 314. (“The purpose and language of the statute limited the remedies available to the
District Court; only an injunction could vindicate the objectives of the [ESA].”).
79. Id. at 314–20.
80. Id. at 314.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 316.
83. Id. The Court noted that the “ultimate objective of the FWPCA was to eliminate all discharges of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985.” Id. To meet this goal, the statute required the
use of “best practicable control technology currently available” by July 1, 1977, and the “best available technology economically achievable” by July 1, 1983. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 320. (“Rather than requiring a district court to issue an injunction for any and all
statutory violations, the FWPCA permits the district court to order that relief it considers necessary
to secure prompt compliance with the Act. That relief can include but is not limited to an order of
immediate cessation.”).
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ly the exercise of the court’s discretion.”86 The district court could order
the relief it considered necessary to secure prompt compliance with the
FWPCA, including but not limited to an order of immediate cessation.87
The Court’s holding was clear: unlike the ESA, FWPCA did not limit a
court’s equitable discretion in ordering remedies.
The Court further described the requested remedy, a preliminary injunction, in terms of “commonplace considerations.”88 First, an injunction is not a “remedy which issues as of course.”89 Rather, injunctions are
appropriate only where the intervention of a court of equity “is essential
‘to protect property rights against injuries otherwise irremediable.’”90
Second, when there are competing claims of injury, the court “balances
the conveniences of the parties and the possible injuries to them according as they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction.”91 Third, even when there are instances where irreparable injury
may result to the plaintiff, an injunction may be postponed if the injunction will “‘adversely affect a public interest.’”92
The Court did not apply these considerations beyond noting equitable balancing could “fully protect the range of public interests” at issue.93
Because a permit was likely to be issued and compliance with FWPCA
was forthcoming, the balance struck in favor of the Navy.
Weinberger further highlights the importance of the statute involved and makes clear that the “statutory scheme and purpose,” in conjunction with the alleged violation, governs whether a court can engage
in equitable balancing.94 However, the Weinberger Court was “unclear

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 313.
89. Id. at 311 (quoting Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337–38
(1933)).
90. Id. at 312 (quoting Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919)).
91. Id. at 312 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944)). Yakus v. United
States is the first Supreme Court decision to introduce the public interest, albeit in dictum, as a factor
in evaluating preliminary injunctive relief. See Orin H. Lewis, “The Wild Card That Is the Public
Interest”: Putting a New Face on the Fourth Preliminary Injunction Factor, 72 TEX. L. REV. 849,
858 (1994).
92. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312 (quoting Yakus, 321 U.S. at 440).
93. Id. at 320.
94. For further discussion on reconciling traditional equitable discretion with environmental
statutes see Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions, 45
U. PITT. L. REV. 513 (1984). Focusing on TVA and Weinberger, Farber argues that courts and scholars have not spent enough time evaluating the duties created by Congress through environmental
statutes. He explains that when confronted with an injunction alleging a violation of an environmental statute, a court’s focus “should always be on congressional intent, unclouded by the equity mystique.” Id. at 515. Equitable discretion should only be used when “that intent cannot be discerned.”
Id. at 545.
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on the critical issue of the extent of equitable discretion.”95 In addition,
while the court reiterated a few commonplace considerations, it did not
explain how to balance these considerations nor did it mention the success on the merits factor. Thus, courts continued to develop preliminary
injunction standards that weighed these commonplace considerations
differently.
C. Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell and Well-Established
Principles
The final Supreme Court decision before Winter to address environmental preliminary injunctions did so in terms of “well-established
principles.” Like Weinberger, Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell96 involved a procedural violation of a statute, the Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), which protects natural resources in Alaska.97 Several Alaskan native villages sued under ANILCA
to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior’s sale of oil and gas leases, arguing
that the sale would “adversely affect their aboriginal rights to hunt and
fish on the “Outer Continental Shelf.”98 Much like NEPA, ANILCA requires government agencies to prepare environmental impact statements
evaluating the potential environmental impacts of a proposed project.99
Although the United States District Court for the District of Alaska
found that the Secretary of Interior “did not have the policy precepts of
ANILCA in mind at the time of evaluation” and thus had likely violated
the Act, it denied the injunction because the balance of the harms did not
favor the movant and the public interest favored continued oil exploration.100 In reversing the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals explained that “[i]rreparable damage is presumed when an
agency fails to evaluate thoroughly the environmental impact of a proposed action . . . . Injunctive relief is the appropriate remedy for a violation of an environmental statute absent rare or unusual circumstances.”101

95. Id. at 523.
96. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
97. Id. at 535.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 535 n.2; The relevant portion of ANILCA states:
In determining whether the withdraw, reserve, lease or otherwise permit the
use, occupancy or disposition of public lands . . . the head of the Federal
agency having primary jurisdiction of such land, . . . shall evaluate the effect
of such use, occupancy, or disposition, . . . the availability of other
lands . . . and other alternatives.
ANCILA § 810(a), 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (1980).
100. Farber, supra note 94, at 540.
101. Id. at 541 (citation omitted).
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On appeal, the Supreme Court began by reviewing its decision in
Weinberger. The Amoco Court explained its description of the preliminary injunction standard in Weinberger as a “review” of “wellestablished principles” governing equitable relief in federal courts.102
One such principle requires the court to “balance the competing claims
of injury and must consider the effect on each party of granting or withholding of the requested relief.”103 The Court reiterated that “particular
regard should be given to the public interest,” but “‘a federal judge sitting as chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for
every violation of law.’”104 Finally, the Court echoed Weinberger and
emphasized the underlying scheme and purpose of the statute by concluding that the district court’s refusal to issue a preliminary injunction
against all exploration activities did not undermine the purpose of the
Act: to preserve subsistence resources.105
Unlike Weinberger, the Court in Amoco spent more time analyzing
these principles of equitable relief. Specifically, the Court noted that the
injury to subsistence resources from exploration was “not at all probable.”106 On the “other side of the balance of harms” was the monetary
loss the oil company petitioners would have experienced “had exploration been enjoined.”107 The implied conclusion was that the balance of
harms did not tip in favor of the environment. The Court also discussed
“the important role of the ‘public’ interest in the exercise of equitable
discretion.”108 In particular, the Court discussed the policy behind
ANILCA, noting that in ANILCA Congress “expressly declared that
preservation of subsistence resources is a public interest and established
a framework for reconciliation, where possible, of competing public interests.”109 Because the Secretary’s action did not undermine ANILCA’s
substantive policies, the equities indicated that injunctive relief was not
warranted.110
D. The Impact of TVA, Weinberger, and Amoco
While these three Supreme Court decisions set forth important considerations for determining injunctive relief, the decisions did not provide much guidance on how to balance the various considerations in an
102. Id. at 542.
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982)).
105. Id. at 544.
106. Id. at 545.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 546.
110. Id.
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injunction request. Left unanswered was whether all the “wellestablished principles” or “commonplace considerations” need to be
evaluated or whether one principle or consideration was more important
than the others. For instance, the analysis of “public interest” in all three
decisions arises when discussing whether a statutory violation foreclosed
a balancing of harms.111 Beyond this, how “public interest” should be
defined or evaluated as a separate factor is not discussed.112 Similarly,
none of the three decisions evaluated “success on the merits” as a separate factor, despite the Court’s recognition that a district court must consider whether plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are likely to prevail
on the merits.113 This is surprising given that the Court and scholars treat
success on the merits as “an important, perhaps the most important, factor” in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction.114
The Court’s failure to articulate a clear standard for preliminary injunctions and, more importantly, its failure to articulate how the standard
should be applied resulted in inconsistency and confusion among the district courts.115 Inconsistency was particularly common in cases involving

111. See Lewis, supra note 91, at 890 (stating that the court in TVA and Weinberger “merely
used the public interest as a platform for discussing whether or not a showing of a likely statutory
violation foreclosed the balancing of harms”).
112. See Ryan Griffin, Litigating the Contours of Constitutionality: Harmonizing Equitable
Principles and Constitutional Values When Considering Preliminary Injunctive Relief, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 839, 845 (2010) (explaining that the Supreme Court has given “scant explanation of how to
identify situations in which the public interest may override a showing of irreparable harm”). This is
surprising given circuit court characterizations of this factor as a “wild card” in Lawson Products.,
Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1433 (7th Cir. 1986), and criticism of this factor as one that “may
disguise and superficially legitimize a judge’s or party’s personal agenda.” Donald B. Haller, Note,
Granting Preliminary Injunctions Against Dealership Terminations in Antitrust Actions, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1395, 1403–04 (1981).
113. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (“The traditional standard for
granting a preliminary injunction requires the plaintiff to show that in the absence of its issuance he
will suffer irreparable injury and also that he is likely to prevail on the merits.”).
114. See, e.g., Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83 (2007) (“At the preliminary injunction stage, the
court is called upon to assess the probability of the plaintiff’s ultimate success on the merits.”); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (“In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, a
district court must consider whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are likely to prevail on
the merits.”) (emphasis added); John Leubsdorf, Preliminary Injunctions: In Defense of the Merits,
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 35 (2007). In Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009), less than a year
after Winter, the Court also announced that the first two factors—success on the merits and irreparable injury—“are the most critical” in requests to stay the enforcement of a judgment pending the
outcome of an appeal. While a stay is not the same as a preliminary injunction, the Court in Nken
noted the “overlap” between the four factors considered in both because “similar concerns arise
whenever a court order may allow or disallow anticipated action before the legality of that action has
been conclusively determined.” Id.
115. See Axline, supra note 35, at 34 (“The Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a coherent
theory for determining remedies in cases involving statutory violations by federal agencies has created confusion and inconsistency in lower court opinions.”).
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NEPA violations, a statute not addressed in TVA, Weinberger, or Amoco.116
The confusion, however, was not over what principles to evaluate,
but how to evaluate these principles. For the most part, courts addressed
the general principles contained in Amoco: irreparable injury, balancing
the harms, and the public interest. The individual and collective weight
courts gave these principles varied. In some instances, balancing of
harms and public interest received cursory treatment, if they were evaluated at all.117 In other instances, both likelihood of success on the merits
and irreparable harm were required for an injunction to issue.118 Still in
other instances, success on the merits and irreparable harm were interrelated, and a strong showing of irreparable harm could offset less certainty
on the success of the merits factor, requiring only a showing of “serious
questions going to the merits.”119
This variation, also known as the “sliding scale” or “serious questions” test, is central to the environmental plaintiff’s argument for a more
lenient preliminary injunction standard. In some circuits, plaintiffs alleging environmental harm argued that a different preliminary injunction
standard applied when “environmental harms” were alleged.120 These
plaintiffs often quoted the now famous lines from Amoco: “Environmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money
damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e., irreparable. If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance of the
harms will usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the environment.”121 Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs in Winter quoted this language from Amoco when they argued to the Supreme Court that the district court’s finding of a “near certainty” of irreparable harm was plainly
supported by the record.122

116. For cases, see Eubanks, supra note 20.
117. See infra Part III.
118. See infra Part III.
119. Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
109, 113 (2001) (citation omitted).
120. See infra Part III.
121. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987).
122. Brief for the Respondents at 48, Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7
(2008) (No. 07-1239).
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II. WINTER V. NATURAL RESOURCE DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. AND THE
FOUR-FACTOR TEST
A. The Winter Decision
In Winter, environmental organizations including the Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC) challenged the U.S. Navy’s testing of a
mid-frequency sonar detection system by arguing that this military practice was harming sea mammals such as whales and dolphins.123 The
NRDC sought to enjoin the Navy from using sonar during its training
exercises based on alleged violations of NEPA, the ESA and the Coastal
Zone Management Act (CZMA).124 Specifically, the NRDC argued in its
request for an injunction that there was “the clear potential for significant
impact” on the marine environment and that the Navy violated NEPA by
approving the training exercises based only on an Environmental Assessment rather than a full Environmental Impact Statement.125
The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the injunction.126 The Navy appealed to the Supreme Court and the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, holding that the District Court abused its discretion by imposing a 2,200–yard shutdown zone and by requiring the Navy to power
down its MFA sonar during significant surface ducting conditions.127
In reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court, in a
5–4 decision, rejected the argument that a preliminary injunction is appropriate when there is only a “possibility” of irreparable harm.128 Instead, the Supreme Court announced a clear four-factor129 test for preliminary injunctions.130 Specifically, the Court stated that “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on
the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
123. Winter, 555 U.S. 7, 15 (2008).
124. Id.
125. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council.
Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (No. CV06-4131), available at http://docs.nrdc.org/water/wat_060628
01A.pdf. For a more detailed discussion of the complicated procedural history of Winter, see Lisa
Lightbody, Comment, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
593, 597–600 (2009).
126. Winter, 555 U.S. at 15–17.
127. Id. at 15–17, 33.
128. Id. at 21.
129. Although the Court did not use the term factor at this point, it did use the term “factor”
later in its opinion. See id. at 32 (“The factors examined above—the balance of equities and consideration of the public interest—are pertinent in assessing the propriety of any injunctive relief . . . .”).
130. Colburn, supra note 8, at 321–22 (explaining that in Winter, “the Supreme Court (finally)
explicitly endorsed [a] four-factored test, perhaps even turning the four factors into elements”).
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preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that
an injunction is in the public interest.”131
The majority, unsurprisingly,132 held that the trial court abused its
discretion in issuing equitable relief because “even if plaintiffs have
shown irreparable injury from the Navy’s training exercises, any such
injury is outweighed by the public interest in effective, realistic training
of its sailors.”133 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in
part and dissented in part noting that the District Court and Ninth Circuit
failed to “adequately explain . . . its conclusion that the balance of the
equities tips in favor of plaintiffs.”134 Justice Ginsburg and Justice Souter, on the other hand, dissented and noted that courts do not require litigants to always show “a particular, predetermined quantum of probable
success or injury before awarding equitable relief.”135 Instead, “courts
have evaluated claims for equitable relief on a ‘sliding scale,’ sometimes
awarding relief based on a lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood
of success is very high.”136 Justice Ginsburg and Justice Souter concluded that the NRDC demonstrated “substantial harm to the environment,”
“almost inevitable success on the merits of its claim,” 137 and that “the
District Court conscientiously balanced the equities and did not abuse its
discretion.”138

131. Winter, 555 U.S. at 19. After setting forth this standard, the Court cited three of its prior
decisions: Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 692 (2008) (holding that a court must consider the merits
of an underlying habeas petition before granting a preliminary injunction prohibiting the transfer of
an American citizen to Iraqi custody), Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–312
(1982), and Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987). As explained in Part I.B–C.,
the Amoco and Weinberger decisions described the preliminary injunction standard in terms of
“well-established principles” and “commonplace considerations” rather that the “four-factor” test
seen in Winter. Similarly, Munaf did not provide a “four-factor” test and instead stated that “[a]
preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary and drastic remedy’ . . . never awarded as of right. Rather, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate, among other things, “a likelihood of
success on the merits.” Munaf, 553 U.S. at 690–91 (citation omitted).
132. See Joel R. Reynolds et al., No Whale of a Tale: Legal Implications of Winter v. NRDC,
36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 753, 753 (2009) (calling the outcome of Winter “hardly revolutionary”).
133. Winter, 555 U.S. at 23.
134. Id. at 41(Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
135. Id. at 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 53–54.
138. Id. at 44. Environmental advocates have relied on Justice Ginsburg’s dissent to argue that
the sliding-scale language has survived.
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B. Winter’s Preliminary Injunction Standard Analyzed
The majority’s analysis of the injunction request in Winter has been
described as “cursorily,”139 “summarily,”140 and “limited.”141 These critiques stem from the Court’s brief discussion of the NEPA statute, the
four preliminary injunction factors, and the relationship between each
factor.
Some of the harshest criticisms focus on the Court’s cursory treatment of the alleged statutory violation. Unlike the Court’s decisions in
TVA, Weinberger, and Amoco where the Court thoroughly analyzed the
correlating statutes, the Court in Winter gave little thought or acknowledgement of the purpose or objectives of NEPA.142 Instead, the Court
addressed NEPA in a perfunctory manner.143 In particular, the Court’s
unwillingness to examine the merits of the case—whether NEPA was
violated—allowed the Court in Winter to avoid any serious consideration
of NEPA or its purposes.144 One scholar has noted that “[t]o the majority,
it appears, NEPA represents nothing more than paper work.”145 And this
139. Peter Manus, Five Against the Environment, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 221, 225 (2010) (noting that the majority opinion “rested on an all-or-nothing comparison of two dissimilar and only
cursorily analyzed public interests”).
140. Lightbody, supra note 125, at 602 (stating that the Court “summarily concluded” that
“[t]he public interest in conducting training exercises with active sonar under realistic conditions
plainly outweighs the [environmental] interests advanced by the plaintiffs”).
141. See Manus, supra note 139, at 224 (stating that “the Court considered the outcome of this
comparison so obvious that it offered little in the way of analysis in its opinion”); see also Susan
Lee, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: The U.S. Supreme Court Vacates a Preliminary Injunction That Imposed Mitigation Measures on Defense Training, 16 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L.
187, 191 (2009) (“[T]he Court’s limited analysis, consisting only of the procedural aspects of the
preliminary injunction, rather than the plaintiffs’ substantive claim, undermined the policy goal of
the NEPA to ensure ‘that the agency will not act on incomplete information, only to regret its decision after it is too late to correct.’” (quoting Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371
(1989))).
142. See Manus, supra note 139; Lee, supra note 141. But see Eubanks, supra note 20, at 657
(stating that the Court in Winter “implicitly” acknowledges the “‘statutory scheme and purpose’
approach” to NEPA and that “the Court factored NEPA’s unique scheme and purpose into its preliminary injunction analysis, but it qualified the level of weight accorded to the statutory purpose”).
143. In fact, the Court only spent one paragraph discussing what I would call the “scheme and
purpose” of NEPA when discussing the preliminary injunction standard. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 23
(majority opinion).
144. See Richard Lazarus, The National Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Reappraisal
and a Peek Behind the Curtain, 100 GEO. L.J. 1507, 1561 (2012) (stating that the “Court relied on
NEPA’s procedural-only character to justify its ruling” and “never needed to reach the issue whether
the Navy had in fact violated NEPA”). The majority of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, however, addresses the underlying merits of plaintiffs’ claims directly noting that “[i]f the Navy had completed
the EIS before taking action, as NEPA instructs, the parties and the public could have benefited from
the environmental analysis – and the Navy’s training could have proceeded without interruption.
Instead, the Navy acted first, and thus thwarted the very purpose an EIS is intended to serve.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 43 (Ginesburg, J., dissenting).
145. See Manus, supra note 139, at 242.
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“brush-off of the statute suggests an almost taunting commentary on its
purpose.”146 As a result, Winter has been labeled a decision based on the
“unarticulated personal value system shared by five Supreme Court Justices.”147
The Court’s treatment of the individual factors was equally deficient. Although Winter outlined a four-factor standard and stated that the
plaintiff “must establish” all four factors, the Court did not define or explain how these factors are demonstrated148 or how they relate to one another. 149 In fact, the Court’s discussion of these factors does not reflect a
standard requiring satisfaction of all four factors. For example, after
clearly stating the four factors of a preliminary injunction, the Court began its analysis with a summary of the parties’ position and a discussion
of the second factor, irreparable harm, not the first, success on the merits.150 The Court discussed whether the plaintiffs must demonstrate a
“likelihood” of irreparable injury—not just a possibility—in order to obtain preliminary relief.151 Finding the “‘possibility’ standard . . . too lenient,” the Court reiterated that the second factor of the preliminary injunction standard requires showing that “irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.”152
The Court, however, did not rule conclusively on whether irreparable harm to plaintiffs was likely, instead stating that “even if plaintiffs
[had] shown irreparable injury from the Navy’s training exercises, any
such injury [was] outweighed by the public interest and the Navy’s inter-

146. Id.
147. Id. at 224.
148. See id. (noting that the two public interests at stake were “broadly” defined).
149. See e.g., Amber R. Woodward, The Scope of “Plaintiffs’ Harm” in Environmental Preliminary Injunctions, 88 WASH U.L. REV. 507, 522 (2010) (“In defining the plaintiffs’ harm, the
Court did not state whether it should consider the harm to the NRDC organizations members, the
harm to the marine mammals, or the harm to both”); see also John M. Newman, Raising the Bar and
the Public Interest: On Prior Restraints, “Traditional Contours,” and Constitutionalizing Preliminary Injunctions in Copyright Law, 10 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 323, 359 (2011) (explaining that
“neither eBay nor Winter was sufficiently clear on the question of how to apply the new test”); Griffin, supra note 112, at 845 (explaining that in Winter, “the Supreme Court once again failed to provide a comprehensive standard”).
150. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 21 (2008). This is unusual because
most trial courts begin by discussing success on the merits. An exception to this was the Fourth
Circuit where before Winter, courts first engaged in a balancing of the “likelihood of irreparable
harm to the plaintiff, against the likelihood of harm to the defendant.” See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal.
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 528 F. Supp. 2d 625, 630 (S.D. W. Va. 2007). If this balance of harm
favored the plaintiffs, then the court considered the likelihood of success on the merits. Id.; see also
Montrose Parkway Alt. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 405 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592 (D. Md.
2005).
151. Winter, 555 U.S. at 375.
152. Id.
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est in effective, realistic training of its sailors.”153 Similarly, the Court did
not analyze whether the first factor—success on the merits—was met,154
a factor that the district court, the appellate court, and Justice Ginsburg in
her dissent all concluded weighed in the plaintiffs favor. Rather, the majority stated that it did “not have to address the lower courts’ holding . . .
[on] likelihood of success on the merits” because “public interest and the
Navy’s interest in effective, realistic training of its sailors” weighs
against granting injunctive relief.155
The Court’s decision thus rests on the last two factors: balancing
the competing interests of the parties and the public interest. 156 Drawing
from Amoco and Weinberger, the Court describes these factors as “balanc[ing] the competing claims of injury and . . . the effect on each party
of the granting or withholding of the requested relief”157 and as “the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of an injunction.”158 As for balancing the harms, the Court determined that the harm
to the safety of a Navy fleet if deployed with inadequate training was
greater than the harm to the unknown number of marine mammals.159
With the final factor, the Court concluded that “the public interest in
conducting training exercises with active sonar under realistic conditions
outweighs the [environmental] interests advanced by the plaintiffs.”160 In
the end, the Court determined that “the balance of equities and consideration of the overall public interest in [the] case tip strongly in favor of the
Navy.”161
Because the Court’s analysis focused on the last two factors, it does
not provide any instruction on how all four factors should be balanced in
relation to each other. In addition, the Court did not address whether the
153. Id. at 376.
154. Id. at 381 (“[W]e do not address the underlying merits of plaintiffs’ claims. While we
have authority to proceed to such a decision at this point, doing so is not necessary here.”).
155. Id. at 376.
156. Id. at 376–381; see also Del. Dep’t of Natural Res. & Envtl. Control v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 681 F. Supp. 2d 546, 562 (D. Del. 2010) (acknowledging “the substantial weight accorded
to the public interest by the Supreme Court in Winter”); Manus, supra note 139, at 225 (noting that
the majority opinion “rested on an all-or-nothing comparison of two dissimilar and only cursorily
analyzed public interests”); Stellakis, supra note 21, at 374 (referring to the last two factors as the
“vastly dominant factors” and the factors on which the Court “hangs its harpoon”).
157. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 541
(1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
158. Id. at 24–25 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
159. Id. at 26.
160. Id.
161. Id. Another criticism of Winter involves the standard of review used by the Supreme
Court. See Reynolds et al., supra note 132, at 765 (“[T]he majority never explicitly measured the
district court’s factual findings against the well-established standard for appellate review of factual
findings—that is, whether the court’s findings were clearly erroneous.”).
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sliding scale approaches of the Ninth Circuit and other circuits were still
valid.162 This lack of guidance has led to a few unique interpretations of
Winter. One trial court has stated that the preliminary injunction standard
only requires consideration of the last two factors. In Wildlands v. U.S.
Forest Service, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon
cited Winter when stating that “the court considers [only] the balance of
equities and the public interest” when determining “whether to issue the
injunctive relief requested by the plaintiffs.”163 This decision, however,
appears to be an aberration.
The more pressing concern is whether the preliminary injunction
standard is a factor or element test.164 Elemental tests and factor tests are
two different types of inquiries that a court may use to determine whether
a party has satisfied its burden of proof.165 In an element test, a party
must meet each element to meet its burden of proof.166 In contrast, in a
factor test, each factor does not need to weigh in favor of the party as
long as some of the factors do.167
This misperception of the standard set forth by the Supreme Court
in Winter as a more stringent element test is reflected in several subsequent decisions. A few trial courts post-Winter treat the preliminary injunction standard as an element test. For example, the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas recently noted after quoting
the Winter standard that “[t]he plaintiff must satisfy all four requirements.”168 In another example, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California characterized the preliminary injunction
standard as “the four-element Winter test.”169 Practitioners, too, have explained the Winter standard as an element test such that the “four factors
162. Winter, 555 U.S. at 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This Court has never rejected
[the sliding scale test], and I do not believe it does so today.”).
163. Wildlands v. U.S. Forest Serv., 791 F. Supp. 2d 979, 993 (D. Ore. 2011) (citing Winter,
555 U.S. 7).
164. As a legal writing professor, I spend some time in the first semester teaching the difference between factor tests and element tests. Many legal writing and analysis texts emphasize this
difference. See DAVID S. ROMANTZ & KATHLEEN ELLIOTT VINSON, LEGAL ANALYSIS: THE
FUNDAMENTAL SKILL 32–33 (2009); CHRISTINE COUGHLIN ET AL., A LAWYER WRITES 61–63
(2008).
165. ROMANTZ & VINSON, supra note 164, at 32.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Aquifer Guardians in Urban Areas v. Fed. Highway Admin., 779 F. Supp. 2d 542, 564
(W.D. Tex. 2011) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 21–22 (2008)).
169. Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Grantham, No. 2:10-cv-02350-GEB-CMK, 2010 WL
3958640, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2010). After determining that the plaintiff did not satisfy the first
factor—likelihood of success—the court determined that it “need not address the three remaining
Winter factors, i.e. whether Plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, the balance of equities tips in their favor, and [the] preliminary injunction is in the public
interest.” Id. at *15.
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are not to be balanced against one another, but that each of the four factors must be met before any injunction may issue.”170
These varying interpretations of Winter support the complaint that
the Supreme Court’s analysis of the preliminary injunction standard is
imprecise. And the treatment of the factors as elements supports the argument that Winter is more stringent. Under an element standard, environmental plaintiffs would be required to satisfy all of the factors—
success on the merits, irreparable harm, balancing, and public interest—
in their favor. Requiring all four “prongs” to be shown separately under
all circumstances heightens the preliminary injunction standard and in
effect converts a factor test into an element test.171 This lack of guidance
from the Supreme Court may lead judges to rule how they desire, whether that be pro-environment or pro-defendant.172 This is particularly true
with the “wild card”173 factor: public interest.
Juxtaposing these scholarly concerns is the reality: Because of this
lack of detail, most courts—for the time being—have been able to retain
their earlier flexible standards.174 On the ground, many circuit courts
have reevaluated their circuit standard in light of Winter, and of those
circuits, only the Fourth Circuit has stated that Winter overrules its earlier preliminary injunction standard.175 One circuit, the Second Circuit, has
expressly stated that Winter does not alter any earlier standard, while
three circuits, the Third, Seventh, Eighth have implied the same.176 Two
circuits, the Tenth and Ninth Circuits, now apply Winter in conjunction
with their earlier standards.177

170. Eric J. Murdock & Andrew J. Turner, How “Extraordinary” Is Injunctive Relief in Environmental Litigation? A Practitioner’s Perspective, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10464,
10466 (2012).
171. A similar complaint has been made about the U.S. Supreme Court decision eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 338 (2006). See Gergen et al., supra note 29, at 208 (stating that the
four-factor test for the permanent injunction in eBay “presents its factors as four separately assessed
prongs, rather than as true ‘factors’—i.e., elements of an overall decision making process that can be
weighed with or against one another”).
172. See Woodward, supra note 149, at 527–28 (stating with regard to the irreparable harm
factor that “[a] clear standard is necessary because, without it, both parties are unable to properly
prepare for litigation, and courts are left to their own devices in choosing between outcomedispositive standards”).
173. Lawson Prods., Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1433 (7th Cir. 1986).
174. See infra Part III.
175. See infra Part III.
176. See infra Part III.
177. See infra Part III.
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III. TESTING THE WATERS: RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS
A. Research Design
Many commentators have made sweeping claims about the status of
preliminary injunctions post-Winter with few data points.178 Similarly,
focusing only on the quantitative results excludes any analysis of the
content of the trial court orders. This study includes a textual analysis of
the trial court orders to complement the numerical findings, thereby allowing for a more robust analysis of Winter’s effect.179
In an effort to better understand what changes Winter may have
caused to a trial court’s analysis of an environmental preliminary injunction request, I evaluated six years’ worth of preliminary injunctions issued by federal district courts.180 To fall within my data set, the case had
to be “environmental”; that is, environmental protection or natural resource matters were at stake,181 and it had to involve a preliminary injunction, as opposed to a permanent injunction,182 a temporary restraining order (TRO), or a stay pending appeal.183 I further refined my data set
178. See supra notes 20–22.
179. “[D]ata capture[s] votes rather than opinions. For the actual development of the law, the
opinion matters a great deal.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 65 (2006).
180. Using November 12, 2008, the date of the Winter decision, as my starting point, I gathered decisions from online legal research search engines covering the three years before and the
three years after the Winter decision. My search terms included “preliminary injunction” and “environmental harm” or “environmental injury” on Westlaw, WestlawNext, LexisNexis, and LexisNexis
Advance. These search terms returned an over-inclusive list of cases from which I narrowed the data
set to include only trial court decisions.
181. See Lazarus, supra note 7, at 708 n.4 (describing environmental cases as those cases
whose “threshold inquiry turns on whether environmental protection or natural resources matters are
at stake”).
182. While the standard for preliminary and permanent injunctions is almost identical, there are
substantial differences in the application of these standards. See Douglas Laycock, The Death of the
Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 691–92 (1990) (describing the differences between
permanent and preliminary injunctions and noting that “[a]lthough the vocabulary of adequate remedy and irreparable injury is common to both preliminary and permanent relief, the competing considerations are quite different at the two stages of litigation”); see also Daniel Mach, Rules Without
Reasons: The Diminishing Role of Statutory Policy and Equitable Discretion in the Law of NEPA
Remedies, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 205, 222 n.94 (2011) (stating that “substantial differences exist
between preliminary and permanent injunctions”).
183. While the standards for temporary restraining orders (TROs) and stays pending appeal
appear similar to preliminary injunctions, they are in fact different. In a TRO, an evaluation of the
last factor is one-sided—the harm from the issuing of the TRO itself. See 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET
AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 65.36(1), at 65–83 (3d ed. 2004); see also Cnty. of Los Alomos
v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, No. CIV 05-1343 JB/LAM, 2006 WL 1308305, at *7 (D. N.M. Jan. 13,
2006) (“To obtain a TRO, the moving y must establish four requirements: (i) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (ii) irreparable injury to the movant if the relief is denied; (iii) the
threatened injury to the movant outweighs the injury to the other party under the TRO; and (iv) the
TRO, if issued, is not adverse to the public interest.”). Stays, like TROs, are similar but not the same
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to focus on litigation involving an environmental plaintiff, such as an
environmental group, seeking an injunction from a governmental entity,
most often through a citizen suit provision of an environmental statute,
similar to TVA, Weinberger, Amoco, and Winter.184 My final data set
consists of 74 trial court decisions: 33 were issued in the three years before Winter, and 41 were issued in the three years after Winter.185
To help better understand whether Winter had altered the way in
which trial courts approached environmental preliminary injunctions, I
gathered quantitative and qualitative data from these cases. Together, this
data provides a more complete evaluation of the changes in environmental preliminary injunctions since Winter.
B. Numerical and Textual Results: A Summary
To summarize the numerical results,186 Tables 1 and 2 provide the
distribution of injunction requests and the types of environmental claims
involved in these requests. Tables 3 and 4 display the number of injunction requests granted and denied both overall (Table 3) and by statute
(Table 4). Tables 5, 6, and 7 include the injunction standard used by trial
courts and assess any change in the standard used. More specifically,
as preliminary injunctions. In Nken v. Holder, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a stay
is a type of injunction. Instead, the Supreme Court explained that each is a distinct action. 556 U.S.
418, 425 (2009). A stay operates on the “judicial proceeding itself” while an injunction “direct[s] the
conduct of a particular actor.” Id. at 428.
184. See Denise E. Antolini, National Park Law in the U.S.: Conservation, Conflict, and Centennial Values, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 851, 889–90 (2009) (describing the usual
characteristics of public interest litigation: (1) the lawsuit is directed against the government agency,
and the resource developer who stands to lose if the suit is successful often intervenes on the side of
the government; (2) the plaintiffs claim that the agency has violated several federal (and state) statutes; (3) procedural claims are more numerous and more likely to succeed than substantive claims;
(4) the relief demanded is equitable, obviating the need for jury trials; and (5) the request for a preliminary injunction, often with a companion request for summary judgment, often is the critical stage
in the litigation) (citing GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, 1 PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW § 2:10 (2d ed. 2007)); see also Richard J. Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental
Protection Law in the Supreme Court, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (calling the role of citizen suit enforcement in environmental law “one of environmental law’s essential hallmarks”). I also
had a few cases involving a state, city, or Indian tribe suing a governmental entity.
185. I recognize that I may be missing injunction orders that are not available through on-line
sources. I also recognize that my evaluation does not take into account those plaintiffs who have
intentionally avoided pursuing preliminary injunctions post-Winter because of the perceived heightened standard. Again, this study is a starting point for assessing Winter’s effect.
186. My research looked at the entire population of environmental preliminary injunctions
issued over a six year period, as opposed to a random sample. For that reason, significance tests were
not performed. Using the term “statistically significant” in light of the fact that a random sample was
not used would be misleading because it may implicitly attribute to finding greater scientific importance than it merits. I would note, however, that whether statistical significance tests should be
applied to population data remains contested. See Scott Phillips, Legal Disparities in the Capital of
Capital Punishment, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 739 n.66 (2009).
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Table 5 reports whether trial courts post-Winter cited the standard of
their circuit, the Winter standard, or some combination of the two, while
Table 6 records the number of courts referencing the “sliding scale” or
“serious questions” test. Table 7 adds further information by assessing
whether the standard articulated post-Winter is a change to the standard
used pre-Winter. Finally, Table 8 records trial courts’ treatment of the
public interest factor both before and after Winter.
In addition to the numerical data, the results include a textual analysis of post-Winter trial court decisions for a more thorough evaluation of
Winter’s influence.187 Although not every court has confronted Winter, a
textual analysis of those that have uncovers three approaches to evaluating preliminary injunction requests post-Winter: apply the Winter standard, apply the relevant circuit standard, or apply both the Winter and the
relevant circuit standard.
C. The Universe of Environmental Preliminary Injunctions
The first two tables provide background information on the environmental injunction requests reviewed for this study. Table 1 provides
the number of injunction requests ruled on by trial courts in each circuit,
while Table 2 records the environmental statute involved in the injunction request.
Table 1: Distribution of Injunction Requests
Circuit of Trial
Court Decision
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh
D.C.
Total Number

Pre-Winter

Post-Winter

3
1
2
2
1
2
0
1
16
4
1
1
33

3
2
1
1
1
0
1
2
23
3
1
3
41

187. I am cognizant of the argument that through the selection of my cases, I somehow created
a sample, thereby necessitating a statistical analysis. For this reason and the reasons stated above, I
engaged in a qualitative analysis of the decisions in my data set.
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Table 2: Types of Claims
Type of Claim
National Environmental Protection Act
(NEPA)
National Forestry Management Act (NFMA)
Clean Water Act (CWA)
Endangered Species Act (ESA)
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)
Federal Land Management and Policy Act
(FLMPA)
Public Nuisance
Other: MLA, NMSA, SMCRA, OCSLA,
LWCFA, and others

Pre-Winter
28

Post-Winter
29

6
6
4
2
1

4
7
10
1
3

1

4

0
5

2
8

Table 1 shows an increase in the number of preliminary injunctions
ruled on after Winter. Specifically, eight more injunctions were ruled on
during the three years evaluated post-Winter. Table 1 also shows that
both before and after Winter, trial courts in the Ninth Circuit evaluated
the greatest number of preliminary injunction requests with trial courts in
the Tenth and First Circuits following at a distant second and third. The
increase in the number of preliminary injunctions reviewed suggests that
Winter has not discouraged environmental plaintiffs from brining injunction requests.
Table 2 shows little change in the statutes involved in environmental injunction request. Not surprisingly, injunction requests for NEPA
violations are significantly more than any other environmental statute
both before and after Winter. The National Forestry Management Act
(NFMA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA) round out the second and third
most popular act in injunction requests pre-Winter, but ESA is the second
most frequent act in injunction requests post-Winter. The increase in the
number of injunction requests under the ESA may be the result of the
different standards courts used for evaluating injunction requests for
ESA violations.188 For example, in Center for Biological Diversity v.
188. Compare Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1167 (D. Mont. 2008)
(stating that “[t]he third [preliminary injunction] test applies to ESA injunctions. Applying this test,
the court must still measure the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the possibility of irreparable injury. . . [O]nce likelihood of success and irreparable injury are shown, the court may not
fine-tune its analysis by weighing the hardships of the parties. This legal principal is a direct acknowledgment of congressional intent. . . . What this means is that if a plaintiff is likely to succeed
on its ESA claim and irreparable injury is possible, then the court should issue an injunction when it
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U.S. Forest Service, the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona noted that the defendant confused the “irreparable harm” standard from Winter with the “institutionalized caution” standard used in injunctions brought under the ESA.189 However, not all courts treat preliminary injunctions for ESA violations in the same manner.190
There is also an increase in the number of injunction requests
brought under public nuisance claims, which may be a result of the return to public nuisance actions in environmental litigation.191
D. The Outcome of Environmental Preliminary Injunctions
The next two tables present the outcomes of the preliminary injunction requests. Table 3 displays the overall results based on three possible
outcomes of the requests: denied, granted, or granted in part/denied in
part. Table 4 displays the outcome of the injunction requests based on the
environmental statute involved. Both tables present the data numerically
and as a percentage.
Table 3: Injunctions Overall
Injunction Outcome
Denied
Granted
In part

Pre-Winter (33)
17
13
3

Post-Winter (41)
22
12
7

is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the ESA.”); see also Florida Key Deer v. Brown, 386 F.
Supp. 2d 1281, 1284 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (“In cases involving the ESA, the standard is different. Specifically, the third and fourth prongs of the injunction analysis have been foreclosed by Congress.”);
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 820 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D. Ariz. 2011) (“By enacting the ESA, Congress altered the normal standards for injunctions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65. The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that ‘[t]he traditional preliminary injunction
analysis does not apply to injunctions issued pursuant to the ESA.’” (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v.
NMFS, 422 F.3d 782, 793 (9th Cir. 2005))). The Supreme Court stated that in enacting the ESA
“Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been
struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities.” TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
194 (1978). “Accordingly, courts may not use equity’s scales to strike a different balance.” Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n, 422 F.3d at 794 (internal quotation marks omitted).
189. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 820 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1039 (D. Ariz.
2011).
190. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1207 (D. Mont. 2009) (noting
that Hill “does not command a separate ESA standard when measured by the Court’s ruling in Winter”); see also Defenders of Conewango Creek v. Echo Developers, LLC., No. 06-242E, 2007 WL
3023927, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2007) (stating the court “will not disregard the traditional analysis” as it rejected the argument that a court of equity is stripped of its usual discretion in cases alleging a violation of the ESA).
191. See Richard O. Faulk, Uncommon Law: Ruminations of Public Nuisance, 18 MO. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2010) (noting the “growth” in public nuisance claims “in climate change and
environmental litigation, where it seems to be the ‘tort of choice’ for plaintiffs seeking breathtakingly broad relief from global warming and trans-border pollution”).
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53.6%
29.3%
17%

Table 4: Injunctions by Statute
Most Common
Environmental
Statutes
NEPA

Pre-Winter

Post-Winter

Denied: 15 (53.6 %)
Granted: 12 (42.9%)
In part: 1 (3.6%)
Total: 28

Denied: 16 (55.1%)
Granted: 11 (34.5%)
In part: 3 (10.3%)
Total: 29

NFMA

Denied: 3 (50%)
Granted: 3 (50%)
In part: 0
Total: 6

Denied: 3 (75%)
Granted: 0
In part: 1 (25%)
Total: 4

CWA

Denied: 4 (66.6%)
Granted: 2 (66.6%)
In part: 0
Total: 6

Denied: 5 (71.4%)
Granted: 0
In part: 2 (28.6%)
Total: 7

ESA

Denied: 2 (50%)
Granted: 2 (50%)
In part: 0
Total: 4

Denied: 4 (40%)
Granted: 3 (30%)
In part: 3 (30%)
Total: 10

As demonstrated in Table 3, the overall number of injunctions denied has not changed dramatically (51.5% pre-Winter compared to
53.6% post-Winter—a difference of 2.1%). The number of injunctions
granted has decreased slightly (39.4% pre-Winter compared to 29.3%
post-Winter—a difference of 10.1%), but the number of injunctions
granted in part and denied in part has increased slightly by almost the
same amount. (9.1% pre-Winter to 17% post-Winter—a difference of
7.9%).
A similar trend appears with percentages by statute. Table 4 illustrates that the number of NEPA injunctions denied increased by 1.5%,
the number of injunctions granted decreased by 8.4%, and the number of
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injunctions granted in part and denied in part increased by 6.7%. The
numbers in these tables suggest that an injunction is less likely to be issued post-Winter but only slightly so. Again, the percentages suggest that
Winter has had a mild effect on environmental preliminary injunctions.
E. The Preliminary Injunction Standard Used: Numerical Results
Tables 5 and 6 record the standard trial courts employed when reviewing preliminary injunctions in environmental cases. Table 5 displays
the preliminary injunction standard that appears in post-Winter trial court
decisions, while Table 6 records whether the trial court mentioned an
alternative sliding scale or serious questions test as part of the preliminary injunction standard.
Table 5: Post-Winter: Preliminary injunction standard
stated by trial courts
Standard
Winter & Circuit Standard
Winter Standard Only
Circuit Standard Only
No Standard

Number of Trial Courts (41)
22
13
3
3

Table 6: Pre- and Post-Winter reference to sliding scale or
serious questions

Sliding Scale or
Serious Questions Test
Mentioned

Pre-Winter (33)
Total: 20
60.6%

Post-Winter (40)
Total: 23
57.5%

As shown in Table 5, many trial courts state the four-factor standard from Winter, but most trial courts cite Winter along with their circuit
standard. This data suggests that while some courts are relying on only
Winter, more than half of the trial courts confronted with a preliminary
injunction state the Winter standard in conjunction with their earlier circuit standard. Table 6 supports the argument that the sliding scale test
has survived Winter,192 but reference to this test has decreased slightly.
Thus, Winter has a presence, but it does not dominate trial court orders.
192. Susan Jane Brown & Rachel Fazio, Preliminary Injunctive Relief in the Ninth Circuit
after Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 37 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 78, 87 (2010),
available at http://elq.typepad.com/currents/2010/10/currents37-09-brown-2010-1012.html#_edn22
(remarking that the “sliding scale test remains good law”); see also Jean C. Love, Teaching Prelimi-
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Asserting conclusions based on only the numbers presented in the
tables shown is problematic. First, the number of injunctions evaluated in
my data set is small. Second, the time span evaluated is short. Third, an
evaluation of the number of injunctions granted or denied focuses on the
results and not on why the results are what they are. A similar problem
arises if only the number from the standard stated (Table 5) is evaluated,
as factors can be applied in a variety of ways. Given this reality, I am
reluctant to rely on the quantitative data alone to argue that Winter had a
mild effect. Instead, the number of injunctions granted and denied and
the preliminary injunction standard stated is a starting point for further
analysis of Winter’s true effect: how the factors are applied.
F. The Preliminary Injunction Standard Use: The Textual Results
To answer this “application” question, an evaluation of circuit court
opinions was required. Seven circuits have confronted Winter with differing depths of treatment and varying outcomes. From these seven circuits, three approaches have emerged: (1) expressly state that Winter applies; (2) expressly state or imply that the circuit standard applies; (3)
apply Winter with the circuit standard. In addition, two circuits have expressly declined to state whether their earlier preliminary injunction
standard survives post-Winter.193
1. Expressly State That Winter Applies: The Fourth Circuit
The first circuit court to discuss its standard in light of Winter is also the only circuit to reject its earlier standard for Winter. Before Winter,
trial courts in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals used the Blackwelder
balance-of-hardships test.194 Under this analysis, the trial court first “balance[d] the ‘likelihood’ of irreparable harm to the plaintiff against the
‘likelihood’ of harm to the defendant.”195 The next step in the test involved looking at the sliding scale between the merits and irreparable
harm. If the hardship balanced in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff only

nary Injunctions After Winter, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 689, 707–08 (2013) (Professor Love, as a remedies professor, teaches her students that the “door [is] open for the United States Supreme Court to
approve a federal circuit court’s ‘sliding scale’ test for preliminary injunctions that does not include
the mere possibility of irreparable harm standard”).
193. Both the D.C. and Eleventh Circuits explained that they did not have to decide the correct
injunction standard in light of Winter. See Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288,
1292 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 550 F.3d 1306, 1312 n.10 (11th
Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 131 S. Ct.
1101 (2011).
194. Moore v. Kempthorne, 464 F. Supp. 2d 519, 525 (E.D. Va. 2006) (quoting Blackwelder
Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 195 (4th Cir. 1977)).
195. Id.
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had to show that questions raised concerning the merits were “‘so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them fair ground for
litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation,’” rather than a likelihood of success.196 The importance of the merits of the case increased,
however, as the “probability of irreparable injury diminished.”197 Thus,
under the Blackwelder preliminary injunction test, the balancing of hardships occurred before a court addressed the question of likelihood of success on the merits, and success on the merits was linked to irreparable
injury in a sliding scale manner.
After Winter, the Fourth Circuit reevaluated the Blackwelder standard in a non-environmental case, Real Truth About Obama, Inc., v. Fed.
Election Committee.198 In Real Truth About Obama, the Fourth Circuit
recognized that the Blackwelder standard stood “in fatal tension” with
Winter199 for four reasons and held that the balancing test established in
Blackwelder no longer applied.200 First, the Fourth Circuit interpreted
Winter as requiring the plaintiff to “clearly demonstrate that it will likely
succeed on the merits”201 in all circumstances. Second, the Fourth Circuit
interpreted Winter as requiring the plaintiff to “make a clear showing that
it is likely to be irreparably harmed absent preliminary relief,” effectively
eliminating any balancing or use of a sliding scale.202 Third, the court
noted that Winter “emphasized the public interest requirement,” a factor
courts did not always evaluate, and now “it must always be considered.”203 Finally, the Fourth Circuit stated that its earlier standard allowed for a “flexible interplay” of factors in contrast to the four Winter
requirements, “each of which must be satisfied as articulated.”204 Beyond
requiring a “clear showing,” the Fourth Circuit did not say by how much
each factor must be met. But by requiring each factor to be met, the
Fourth Circuit turned a balancing-factor test into an element test.
196. Id. (citing Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 195).
197. Id.
198. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2009),
overruled on other grounds by Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct.
2371 (2010).
199. Id. at 346.
200. Id. The Fourth Circuit was very clear in its position: “[T]he Blackwelder balance-ofhardship test may no longer be applied in granting or denying preliminary injunctions in the Fourth
Circuit, as the standard articulated in Winter governs the issuance of preliminary injunctions not only
in the Fourth Circuit but in all federal courts.” Id. at 347.
201. Id.
202. Id. (noting a standard that allows for a “possibility of irreparable injury” when there is a
“strong showing on the probability of success” was “explicitly rejected in Winter”).
203. Id.
204. Id.; see also McCann, supra note 27, at 49 (stating that “the new Obama standard rigidly
requires a ‘clear showing’ of each factor independently and deems the failure to make that showing
as to any single factor fatal to the motion for preliminary injunctive relief” (citation omitted)).
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The one post-Winter trial court decision from the Fourth Circuit
evaluating an environmental injunction was issued after the Real Truth
About Obama and is consistent with this decision. In America Whitewater v. Tidwell, the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina reviewed a preliminary injunction for an alleged violation of
several environmental statutes including the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
and NEPA.205 In its decision, the trial court cited Winter when it restated
the four factors of the preliminary injunction standard and, in accordance
with the Real Truth About Obama, marched through an analysis of each
factor.206 After finding that each factor had not been met, the court denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction.207
While American Whitewater is the only environmental preliminary
injunction decision from the Fourth Circuit, subsequent evaluations of
injunction requests will, like American Whitewater, follow the Real
Truth About Obama and require that each factor be met. As a result of
this stricter standard,208 future environmental plaintiffs in the Fourth Circuit will have less success with their injunction requests. For the moment, this is the only circuit in which this is true. The Fourth Circuit is
also a circuit that does not valuate very many environmental preliminary
injunctions,209 and its impact on the overall number of injunctions granted and denied is minor. Fortunately for the environmental plaintiff, all
the circuits to address Winter have taken approaches different from the
Real Truth. These circuits have either retained or reconciled their earlier
standards with Winter or have avoided the issue all together.
2. Expressly State or Imply the Circuit Standard Applies
a. Expressly State the Circuit Standard Applies: The Second Circuit
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, when
confronted with a preliminary injunction, clearly evaluated its standards
in light of Winter. The Second Circuit, however, reached the opposite
conclusion. Like trial courts in the Fourth Circuit, trial courts in the Second Circuit before Winter used a sliding scale approach to weigh the preliminary injunction factors. The most common standard stated was a
three-part test requiring the plaintiff to establish: (1) irreparable harm; (2)
either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious
205. Am. Whitewater v. Tidwell, No. 8:09-cv-02665-JMC, 2010 WL 5019879 (D. S.C. Dec. 2,
2010).
206. Id. at *10.
207. Id. at *10–14.
208. In fact, in Real Truth About Obama, the Fourth Circuit noted that Winter requirements
were “far stricter” than the Blackwelder requirements. Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 347.
209. See supra Part III (showing the distribution of environmental preliminary injunctions).
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questions going to the merits to make them fair ground for litigation; and
(3) a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in its favor.210
After Winter, the Second Circuit addressed the viability of this
standard in Citigroup Global Markets v. VCG Special Opportunities
Master Fund.211 In Citigroup, the Second Circuit noted that the Supreme
Court in Winter “expressly withheld any consideration of the merits of
the parties’ underlying claims.”212 The Second Circuit interpreted this
silence to mean that the Supreme Court had not foreclosed application of
the “serious question” standard.213 Thus, the Second Circuit held that its
earlier flexible standard “remain[ed] valid.”214
Only two trial courts in the Second Circuit have addressed environmental preliminary injunctions post-Winter. Both stated the four factors from Winter. One trial court mentioned that the Second Circuit’s
serious question standard survives,215 while the other did not.216 Therefore, no clear trend has emerged. By citing Winter, trial courts in the
Second Circuit have signaled that Winter has a role, but that role is limited to identifying the preliminary injunction factors.
b. Imply That the Circuit Standard Survives: The Third, Seventh, and
Possibly Eighth Circuits
A third approach is to imply that an earlier circuit standard applies.
Unlike the Second Circuit, which clearly stated that the “serious question” standard remains valid after Winter, the Third, Seventh, and possibly the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals have subtly suggested that their
circuit standards survive.
i. The Third Circuit
Before Winter, trial courts in the Third Circuit used a traditional
four-factor test balancing all four factors against each other.217 In the one
post-Winter environmental preliminary injunction request from a trial
court in the Third Circuit, the Delaware Department of Natural Re210. Sadler v. Mineta, No. 3:05-CV-1189 (MRK), 2006 WL 2772699, at *18 (D. Conn. Sept.
26, 2006) (citing Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 331 F.3d 342, 348–49 (2d Cir. 2003)).
211. Citigroup Global Markets v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund, 598 F.3d 30 (2d
Cir. 2010).
212. Id. at 37.
213. Id. at 38.
214. Id.
215. Habitat for Horses v. Salazar, 745 F. Supp. 2d 438, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
216. City of Newburgh v. Sarna, 690 F. Supp. 2d 136, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
217. Defenders of Conewango Creek v. Echo Developers, LLC., No. 06-242E, 2007 WL
3023927, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2007) (citing Clean Ocean Action v. York, 57 F.3d 328, 331 (3d
Cir. 1995)); see also FiberMark N. Am., Inc. v. Jackson, CIV. A. 07-839 (MLC), 2007 WL 4157235
(D. N.J. Mar. 28, 2007).
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sources and Environmental Control sought to enjoin the United States
Army Corp of Engineers from a river deepening project, under the Clean
Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Coastal Zone Management Act.218
The trial court cited Winter instead of the Third Circuit when stating the
four-factor preliminary injunction standard.219 The court then evaluated
each of the factors, finding that the first two weighed against the injunction.220 With the final two factors, the court briefly balanced the environmental preservation efforts against the economic interests and concluded that it was in the public interest to proceed with the deepening
project.221 The trial court, therefore, denied the injunction request.222
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ treatment of Winter is consistent with the trial court’s approach. In Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S.
Forest Service, a mineral rights group sought to enjoin the Forest Service
from implementing a policy that would have prevented the owners from
drilling in the national forest until the completion of an EIS.223 The mineral-rights owner moved for a preliminary injunction and the injunction
was granted.224 The trial court noted that, according to the Third Circuit’s
four-factor standard, the movant bears the burden to demonstrate that all
four factors favor preliminary relief.225 These factors, however, are balanced so that if the arguments for one factor are particularly strong, an
injunction may issue even if the arguments in other areas are weak.226
The court also explained that in the Third Circuit, “if a plaintiff demonstrates both a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable injury, it
almost always will be the case that the public interest will favor the
plaintiff.”227 After determining that all the factors weighed in the mineral
owners’ favor, the district court issued the injunction.
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision after
evaluating the same four factors.228 When stating the preliminary injunction standard, the Third Circuit cited its four-factor standard229 and cited
218. Del. Dep’t of Natural Res. & Envtl. Control v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 681 F. Supp.
2d 546, 554 (D. Del. 2010).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 558–62.
221. Id. at 563.
222. Id.
223. Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 09-125, 2009 WL 4937785, at *23 (W.D.
Pa. Dec. 15, 2009).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at *33 (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d
1421, 1427 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994)).
228. Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2011).
229. Id. at 250 (citing Kos Pharm. Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2005)).
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Winter only once, when noting that the public interest analysis may
change when military interests are involved.230 This treatment by the
Third Circuit of its standard and Winter implies that the Third Circuit
standard survives. In the Third Circuit, a four-factor standard where all
the factors are balanced against each other is not viewed to be in conflict
with Winter.
ii. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit standard, which treated success on the merits
as a threshold factor, appears to be valid post-Winter as well. In the Seventh Circuit, a movant was required to make a threshold showing that
demonstrated (1) some likelihood of succeeding on the merits and that it
has “no adequate remedy at law” and (2) it will suffer “irreparable harm”
if preliminary relief is denied.231 If the moving party could not meet these
requirements, the injunction was denied.232 If, however, the movant prevailed, the court then considered (3) the irreparable harm the non-moving
party will suffer if preliminary relief is granted, balancing that harm
against the irreparable harm to the moving party if relief is denied and
(4) the public interest, meaning the consequences of granting or denying
the injunction to non-parties.233 Furthermore, these factors were applied
on a “sliding scale” approach, under which “the more likely it is the
plaintiff will succeed on the merits, the less the balance of irreparable
harms need weigh towards its side.”234
This sliding scale standard appears to survive Winter.235 The one
trial court decision to evaluate a preliminary injunction post-Winter involved a public nuisance claim that alleged that the potential entry of
Asian carp into Lake Michigan posed a public nuisance.236 In Michigan
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, several states sought an injunction to
prevent the emigration of Asian carp through the Chicago Area Waterways System into Lake Michigan.237 After applying the Seventh Circuit
standard, the United States District Court for the Northern District Court
230. Id. at 256 (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008)).
231. Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 11–12.
234. Id. at 12.
235. See Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 2010) (where the Seventh Circuit, after
reciting the Winter standard, remarked that “[t]hese considerations are interdependent: the greater
the likelihood of success on the merits, the less net harm the injunction must present in order for
preliminary relief to be warranted”).
236. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10-CV-4457, 2010 WL 5018559 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 2, 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635
(2012).
237. Id. at *1.
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of Illinois denied this request.238 The trial court cited the Seventh Circuit
threshold and sliding scale standard but added that Winter clarified that
the irreparable harm must be likely.239 Because the plaintiffs did not
show sufficient likelihood of success on the merits or a sufficient prospect of irreparable harm absent an injunction, the court denied the injunction.240
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision denying the injunction because it found the balance
of harms favored the defendants.241 The Seventh Circuit stated the fourfactor preliminary injunction standard for Winter and analyzed each of
the factors, but it continued to refer to the irreparable harm factor as a
threshold requirement.242 The Seventh Circuit did not comment on the
trial court’s reference to the sliding scale approach.243
In another post-Winter decision, the Seventh Circuit, in reference to
the first factor, stated that there must be “a plausible claim on the merits.”244 Although the Seventh Circuit cited Winter, it did not analyze the
validity of its standard post-Winter. Instead, it stated that the strength of
the first factor depends on the remaining factors: “[T]he more net harm
an injunction can prevent, the weaker the plaintiff’s claim on the merits
can be while still supporting some preliminary relief.”245 Thus, the sliding scale standard continues as a viable standard in the Seventh Circuit.246
iii. The Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has offered a similar implied
endorsement of its earlier standard. Before Winter, two standards existed
in the Eighth Circuit: a four-factor standard and an “alternative” standard
that allowed an injunction based on either “(1) probable success on the
merits and possible irreparable injury, or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and
238. Id. at *2.
239. Id. at *13.
240. Id. at *2.
241. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 1635 (2012).
242. Id. at 787.
243. Id. at 782–90.
244. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725
(7th Cir. 2009).
245. Id.
246. See Bates, supra note 3, at 1543; Weisshaar, supra note 11 at 1037. Also, in Alliance for
the Wild Rockies, 622 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit noted that the Seventh
Circuit has held that its earlier standard continues to apply. See infra notes 283–288 and accompanying text.
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balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting preliminary relief.”247 In Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, an environmental organization sued the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and an electric utility alleging the
process for permitting the construction of a new coal-fired power plant
violated the CWA, NEPA, and the ESA.248 The trial court granted the
injunction request and the utility appealed, arguing that the court “‘erred
with respect to each’ of the four requirements for preliminary injunctive
relief cited by the Supreme Court.”249 Specifically, the utility took issue
with the language used by the trial court to describe each factor.250
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit did not recite a preliminary injunction
standard from Winter or the Eighth Circuit.251 Instead, it launched into an
analysis of success on the merits and continued by analyzing the trial
court’s decision on the remaining three factors.252 Although the trial
court used phrases such as “at the very least,” “fair ground for litigation,”
and “serious issues” similar to the “alternative standard” that existed in
the Eight Circuit before Winter,253 the Eighth Circuit held that “any error
by the district court in the wording of its order [was] harmless.”254 It was
clear from the court’s order that the trial court was familiar with Winter.255 In addition, the parties discussed Winter extensively, and the
Eighth Circuit found no reason to believe that the court overlooked any
part of this standard.256
No trial court in the Eighth Circuit has addressed an environmental
preliminary injunction post-Winter, so it is difficult to confidently state
what change has occurred. Practitioners, however, have criticized the
Sierra Club decision for “not faithfully apply[ing] the Winter standard in
substance,”257 noting that some “federal courts of appeal persist in applying more relaxed or ‘flexible’ standards.”258 So, from a practitioner
standpoint, the Eighth Circuit’s flexible factor standard remains intact
post-Winter.

247. Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 112 (8th Cir. 1981).
248. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 645 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2011).
249. Id. at 989.
250. Id. at 990.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 992 (noting that the trial court “used wording once familiar”).
254. Id. at 994.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See Murdock & Turner, supra note 170, at 10470.
258. Id. at 10474.
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3. Apply Winter with the Circuit Standard: Ninth and Tenth Circuits
Less certainty exists in the viability of the standards of the Ninth
and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals post-Winter. Before Winter, the
Tenth Circuit used the same four factors stated in Winter.259 The Tenth
Circuit, however, relaxed the first factor, success on the merits when the
moving party established that the three remaining factors tipped decidedly in its favor.260 In such circumstances, the movant “need only show
questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful as to make them a fair ground for litigation.”261
a. The Tenth Circuit
After Winter, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a mandatory preliminary injunction in RoDa Drilling and noted that the Winter
standard was a “heightened standard.”262 However, the Tenth Circuit
cautioned that the heightened standard applied only to those preliminary
injunctions that are disfavored: preliminary injunctions that alter the status quo, mandatory preliminary injunctions, and preliminary injunctions
that give the movant all the relief it would be entitled to if it prevailed in
the full trial.263 Thus, when the San Luis Valley Ecosystem Council requested a mandatory preliminary injunction for an alleged NEPA violation, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado stated
both the Winter standard and the earlier Tenth Circuit standard stated in
Lundgrin.264 In a footnote, the trial court noted that while the United
States Supreme Court “made clear in Winter that all four elements must
be established to justify issuance of a preliminary injunction,” in certain
circumstances the Tenth Circuit “appears to recognize the continuing
validity of the modified success-on-the-merits formula notwithstanding
the Winter decision.”265
259. See Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 08-cv00462-REB-MEH,
2008 WL 1946818, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 30, 2008) (citing Lundgrin v. Clayton, 619 F.2d 61, 63
(10th Cir. 1980) for the following standard: “A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show (1)
a substantial likelihood that the movant eventually will prevail on the merits; (2) that the movant will
suffer imminent and irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; (3) that the threatened injury to
the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and
(4) that the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest.”).
260. Id. at *2.
261. Id. (citing Nova Health Sys. v. Edmondson, 460 F.3d 1295, 1298 n.10 (10th Cir. 2006)).
262. RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208–09 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that the
movant seeking a mandatory preliminary injunction post-Winter is required “to make a heightened
showing of the four factors”).
263. Id. at 1208 n.3.
264. San Luis Valley Ecosystem Council v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1233,
1239 (D. Colo. 2009).
265. Id. (citing RoDa Drilling, 552 F.3d at 1208 n.3).
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When it came time to apply the preliminary injunction factors, the
district court addressed all “four prongs,”266 saving the likelihood of success on the merits for last. Having found that the first three factors
weighed in the plaintiff’s favor, the court applied the modified test on the
likelihood of success factor.267 The court held that the plaintiff had at
least raised questions going to the merits, which was sufficient when the
plaintiff had established the other three factors in its favor.268 Thus, despite the “clear” statement from the Supreme Court that all factors must
be met, the trial court exercised its discretion in determining how the factors were met.
More recently, the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas recognized the continuing validity of the Tenth Circuit’s modified test while applying both the Winter and Tenth Circuit standards. In
Hillsdale Environmental Loss Prevention, the trial court denied an injunction pending appeal and TRO request for alleged NEPA and CWA
violations after analyzing the request under both the Winter standard and
the Tenth Circuit standard.269 The trial court again noted in a footnote
that the Supreme Court in Winter “did not specifically address the modified test for the ‘likelihood of success’ factor” and therefore “neither rejected the modified test nor endorsed it.”270 Citing RoDa Drilling and
San Luis Valley, the court recognized that it was “bound by Tenth Circuit
precedent, which appears to recognize the continuing validity of the
modified test post-Winter.”271
Based on these decisions, the trial court applied both tests and held
that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the first factor under both the modified
Tenth Circuit test and the Winter test.272 More specifically, the plaintiffs
failed to show a “likelihood of success on the merits” and failed to show
“questions going to merits so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful,
as to make the issues ripe for litigation and deserving of more deliberate
investigation.”273 The court noted that the plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy the
first factor under either standard was sufficient for the court to deny the

266. Id. at 1239.
267. Id. at 1242–46.
268. Id. at 1243.
269. Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10-CV-2008
CM/DJW, 2011 WL 3847383 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2011).
270. Id. at *1 n.1.
271. Id. (citing RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 12009 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009); San
Luis Valley Ecosystem Council, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 n.1).
272. Id. at *1 (“In this case, plaintiffs failed to satisfy the first factor under either standard,
which means injunctive relief—even for seven days—is not warranted.”).
273. Id. at *2.
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current relief.274 Nonetheless, the court evaluated the final injunction factors and noted that neither weighed in the plaintiffs’ favor.275
b. The Ninth Circuit
Before Winter, trial courts in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
could employ one of two tests. Under the “traditional test,” the plaintiff
had to show the same four factors from Winter.276 Under the “alternative
test,” the plaintiff could establish “either a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm or that serious
questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor.”277 The two formulations of the alternative test represent a sliding
scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm increased as the
probability of success decreased.278
Before the Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to address Winter, trial
courts in the Ninth Circuit questioned whether this alternative “slidingscale” test survived.279
The Ninth Circuit, too, is divided on whether the sliding scale
standard continues to apply. In the Ninth Circuit’s first post-Winter decision, Earth Island Institute v. Carlton, it reviewed a decision denying an
injunction pending appeal for an alleged violation of NFMA and
NEPA.280 Although the Ninth Circuit did not comment on the trial
court’s assertion that “there is no longer a viable sliding scale test,”281 it
found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s analysis of all four factors from Winter.282
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit explicitly analyzed its earlier standard
in light of Winter in Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell.283 Alliance
274. Id. at *3.
275. Id.
276. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006).
277. Id.
278. Berryessa for All v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, No. C 07-259 SI, 2007 WL 4209551, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2007) (noting that a plaintiff can demonstrate it is entitled to preliminary
relief “in two ways”).
279. Compare Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, No. CIV.S-09-2020FCD-EFB, 2009 WL 2905801,
at *1 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2009) (noting that “contrary to plaintiff’s continued protestations, Winter represents the sole, controlling standard for preliminary injunction relief. There is no longer a
viable, alternative sliding-scale test . . . .”), with Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Grantham, No.
2:10-cv-02350-GEB-CMK, 2010 WL 3958640 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2010), aff’d sub nom. Klamath
Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Grantham, 424 F. App’x 635 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that the Ninth Circuit’s “‘serious questions’ approach survives Winter when applied as part of the four-element Winter
test”).
280. See Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462 (9th Cir. 2010).
281. Earth Island Inst., 2009 WL 2905801, at *1 n.2.
282. Earth Island Inst., 626 F.3d at 476.
283. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011).
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for the Rockies involved a timber sale that allegedly violated of NEPA
and NFMA.284 The United States District Court for the District of Montana applied Winter as an element test and denied the injunction because
the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, nor
that irreparable injury was likely in the absence of an injunction.285
In reversing this decision, the Ninth Circuit evaluated what other
circuit courts had done in light of Winter and recognized that the Supreme Court did not expressly overrule the sliding scale test.286 In light
of this, the Ninth Circuit held that the serious question standard survives
but that the other factors of Winter must also be met.287 Therefore, the
“serious questions” test “survives . . . when applied as part of the fourelement Winter test.”288 The standard from Alliance for the Wild Rockies,
as opposed to Earth Island Institute, has taken hold in the trial courts of
the Ninth Circuit. Most trial courts list the four factors from Winter followed by the language from Alliance that the serious questions standard
survives and conclude with the statement that the plaintiff must meet all
four factors.289
4. Apply the Circuit Standard When the Circuit Court Is Silent: Trial
Courts in the First, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits
Several circuit courts have not yet addressed Winter. For trial courts
in these circuits, the trend appears to follow their established circuit
standard rather than adopt Winter.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals’ earlier standard included all
four factors, but trial courts placed the greatest emphasis on the first factor, success on the merits. If the plaintiff could not demonstrate that “he
is likely to succeed on his quest, the remaining factors [became] matters

284. Id. at 1130.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1131, 1134 (reviewing at the Fourth, Seventh, and Second Circuits’ standard and
joining with the Seventh and Second Circuits “concluding that the ‘serious questions’ version of the
sliding scale test for preliminary injunctions remains viable after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Winter”).
287. Id. at 1134–35.
288. Id. at 1131–32.
289. Save the Peaks Coal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV-09-8163-PCT-MHM, 2011 WL
671766, at *2 n.1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2011). After quoting the Winter standard, the trial court noted in
a footnote that “[i]n the alternative, the moving party may show, ‘serious questions on merits.’” See
Los Padres Forestwatch v. U.S. Forest Serv., 776 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2011);
Conservation Congress v. U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (E.D. Cal. 2011); W. Watersheds
Project v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 774 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1093 (D. Nev. 2011), aff’d, 443 F. App’x
278 (9th Cir. 2011); Bair v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., No. C 10-04360 WHA, 2011 WL 2650896 (N.D.
Cal. July 6, 2011); W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 (DMG), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 151556 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011).
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of idle curiosity.”290 However, even upon a finding that the first factor
had not been met, trial courts often evaluated the remaining factors.291
This practice remains in place after Winter. Trial courts give credence to Winter by citing the decision for certain principles, such as preliminary injunctions are an extraordinary remedy, but restate the preliminary injunction standard from the First Circuit. Furthermore, when it
comes to applying the standard, trial courts continue to place emphasis
on the first factor and address the remaining factors for completeness
sake.292 Thus, there appears to be no change in the approach taken by
trial courts in the First Circuit when reviewing preliminary injunctions.
There also appears to be little change in the approach taken by trial
courts in the D.C. and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals. Before Winter, the
D.C. Circuit employed a version of the sliding scale standard where all
four factors had to be balanced against one another; it placed particular
emphasis on irreparable injury.293 After Winter, the trial courts presented
with environmental preliminary injunctions have cited Winter, but they
continue to view the four factors as a “continuum, with more of one factor compensating for less of another,” requiring “at least some injury” for
an injunction to issue.294 The D.C. Circuit has addressed Winter in nonenvironmental injunction requests and noted that Winter “could be read
to create a more demanding burden” than the sliding-scale analysis.295
However, the court did not resolve whether the “sliding-scale analysis
survives” Winter because the injunction being reviewed could have been
denied under either approach.296
290. Nw. Bypass Group v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 470 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36 (D. N.H. 2007)
(quoting Weaver v. Henderson, 984 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1993)).
291. Id. at 63 n.49 (“Having concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success, the Court need not proceed any further. For the sake of
completeness, the Court will evaluate the remaining three prongs.”); see also Food & Water Watch,
Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 570 F. Supp. 2d 177, 184 (D. Mass. 2006) (stating that “the first
two factors—likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm—are threshold issues,” which
did not weigh in movant’s favor, but evaluated the remaining two factors nonetheless); Sierra Club
v. Wagner, Civil No. 07-cv-257-SM, 2008 WL 3823700 (D. N.H. Aug. 15, 2008) (noting the importance of the first factor but evaluating all four factors).
292. Phippsburg Shellfish Conservation Comm’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 800 F. Supp.
2d 312, 323 (D. Me. 2011). After resolving the “first and most important injunction criterion against
the Plaintiff,” the court noted that it “could stop here. However for the sake of completeness,” the
court addressed the remaining three injunction criteria. Id. at 326; see also Friends of Merrymeeting
Bay v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 810 F. Supp. 2d 320, 322 (D. Me. 2011) (addressing all four factors
but noting that likelihood of success on the merits is the “most important part of the preliminary
injunction assessment”).
293. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 525 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing
Davenport v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, 166 F.3d 356, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
294. In Def. of Animals v. Salazar, 675 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D.D.C. 2009).
295. Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
296. Id.
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In contrast to the D.C. Circuit, the Fifth Circuit’s pre-Winter standard required all four factors to be met.297 The only post-Winter environmental preliminary injunction request within the Fifth Circuit arose in the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. That trial court interpreted Winter as requiring the plaintiff to “satisfy” all four requirements.298 These similar pre-and-post-Winter approaches suggest that
Winter has not had a dramatic effect in the Fifth Circuit.
5. Not Enough Information to Make a Conclusion: The Eleventh and
Sixth Circuits
Before Winter, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, similar to
other circuits, allowed for a lesser showing of the first factor, serious legal question present as opposed to likelihood of success on the merits,
but only when the other three factors heavily tilted in favor of an injunction.299 Whatever standard employed, a trial court was required to make
“individualized judgments” of each factor.300 In the only post-Winter environmental preliminary injunction request to arise in the Eleventh Circuit, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
did not mention the “serious questions” approach as an alternative to
evaluating injunction requests.301 The court also did not mention a fourfactor test or the factors that must be evaluated when reviewing a request.302 Instead, the trial court cited Winter when stating that the plaintiff must show that irreparable harm is “likely” and when pointing out
that the Supreme Court emphasized the harm to marine mammals as being weighed against national interest.303 The court ultimately denied the
injunction request, focusing on the failure of the plaintiff to demonstrate
that irreparable harm was likely in the absence of an injunction.304
In addition, like the D.C. Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit has avoided
weighing in on Winter. The one Eleventh Circuit decision discussing a
preliminary injunction noted that because it found a preliminary injunc297. Blanco v. Burton, No. Civ.A. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 14, 2006)
(stating all four factors and requiring that the “movant, by a clear showing, carr[y] a burden of persuasion); see also Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 371 (5th Cir. 2008) (requiring that the
plaintiff carry “the burden of persuasive on all four requirements”).
298. Aquifer Guardians in Urban Areas v. Fed. Highway Admin., 779 F. Supp. 2d 542, 564
(W.D. Tex. 2011).
299. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Nos. 3:05-cv-362-J-32TEM, 3:05-cv-459-J32TEM, 2007 WL 402830, at *1 (M.D. Fl. Feb. 1, 2007) (citing Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d
1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986)).
300. Id.
301. Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1323–34.
304. Id. at 1327.
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tion unwarranted, it “need not address . . . the correct equitable standard
for a district court to apply in awarding an injunction . . . in light of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision . . . in Winter.” 305 This limited commentary is not enough to reach a conclusion on Winter’s effect in the Eleventh Circuit.
I am also unable to make a conclusion about changes in the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals because there were no environmental injunction
cases to come out of this circuit in the three years post-Winter. I can only
note that the Sixth Circuit before Winter used a “four factor balancing
test” when considering whether to grant a request for injunction relief.306
A summary of these results appear in the following chart. The overall results in those circuit courts that have addressed their preliminary
injunction standard in light of Winter show that only one circuit—the
Fourth Circuit—has overruled its pre-Winter standard. The Ninth and
Tenth Circuits have modified earlier standards, three circuits have implied that earlier standards continue, while one circuit—the Second Circuit—has expressly held that its pre-Winter standard remains valid.307
Table 7: Summary pre- and post-Winter Injunction Standards Trial
Courts by Circuit
Circuit
Pre-Winter
of Trial
Court
Decision
First
Denied: 3
Granted: 0
In part: 0
Total: 3
Second
Denied: 1
Granted: 0
In part: 0
Total: 1

Post-Winter

Denied: 2
Granted: 0
In part: 1
Total: 3
Denied: 2
Granted: 0
In part: 0
Total: 2

Pre-Winter
Standard

Change in
Standard

Four-factor
test.

No change in
trial courts.

Three-factor
test requiring irreparable harm
(includes
serious
questions as

No change in
trial courts.
Second Circuit
has expressly
addressed Winter. Second
Circuit standard

305. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 550 F.3d 1306, 1312 n.10 (11th Cir. 2008),
abrogated on other grounds by CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101 (2011).
Norfolk, however, is a non-environmental case.
306. Heartwood, Inc. v. Peterson, No. 07-144-KSF, 2008 WL 2151997, at *7 (E.D. Ky. May
21, 2008) (citing Performance Unlimited, Inc. v. Questar Publishers, Inc., 52 F.3d 1373, 1381 (6th
Cir. 1995)).
307. See infra Part III for further analysis of these results.
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Third

Denied: 1
Granted: 1
In part: 0
Total: 2

Denied: 0
Granted: 0
In part: 1
Total: 1

Fourth

Denied: 1
Granted: 1
In part: 0
Total: 2

Denied: 1
Granted: 0
In part: 0
Total: 1

Fifth

Denied: 1
Granted: 0
In part: 0
Total: 1
Denied: 1
Granted: 1
In part: 0
Total: 2

Denied: 1
Granted: 0
In part: 0
Total: 1
Denied: 0
Granted: 0
In part: 0
Total: 0

Seventh

Denied: 0
Granted: 0
In part: 1
Total: 1

Denied: 1
Granted: 0
In part: 0
Total: 1

Eighth

Denied: 0
Granted: 0
In part: 0
Total: 0

Denied: 1
Granted: 0
In part: 1
Total: 2

Sixth

an alternative to likelihood of
success).
Four-factor
test. All factors balanced
against each
other.

Blackwelder
balance of
the hardships test—
balance
hardships
first, then
look at merits
All four factors must be
met.

201
still applies.

No change in
trial courts.
Third Circuit
has impliedly
addressed Winter. Third Circuit standard
still applies.
Change in trial
courts. Fourth
Circuit has expressly addressed Winter.
Fourth Circuit
standard no
longer applies.
No change in
trial courts.

Four-factor
balancing
test.

Not enough
information.

Success on
the merits a
threshold. If
met, other
factors applied on
sliding
scale.
Two
approaches:
Four-factor
test or

No change in
trial courts.
Seventh Circuit
has impliedly
addressed Winter. Seventh
Circuit standard
still applies.
No change in
trial courts.
Eighth Circuit
has impliedly
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serious
questions.

Ninth

Denied: 6
Granted: 18
In part: 2
Total: 16

Denied: 10
Granted: 10
In part: 3
Total: 23

Two approaches:
Four-factor
test or sliding scale.

Tenth

Denied: 2
Granted: 2
In part: 0
Total: 4

Denied: 2
Granted: 1
In part: 0
Total: 3

Eleventh

Denied: 0
Granted: 0
In part: 0
Total: 0

Denied: 0
Granted: 1
In part: 0
Total: 1

D.C.
Circuit

Denied: 1
Granted: 0
In part: 0
Total: 1

Denied: 2
Granted: 1
In part: 0
Total: 3

Modified
success-onthe merits
test. First
factor relaxed when
the moving
party establishes that
the remaining three
factors tip
decidedly in
its favor.
Serious
questions
allowed for
first factor
when other
factors tip in
favor of an
injunction.
Four factors
balanced
against each
other.

[Vol. 37:155
addressed Winter. Eighth Circuit standard
still applies.
Change in trial
court. Ninth
Circuit has expressly addressed Winter.
Trial courts in
the Ninth Circuit apply both,
but if using
sliding scale
other factors
must be met.
Change in trial
court. Tenth
Circuit has addressed Winter.
Trial courts in
the Tenth Circuit apply
Tenth Circuit
standard or
both Tenth Circuit and Winter.

Not enough
information.

No change in
trial court.
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A possible explanation for these different approaches turns on the
Supreme Court’s treatment of the individual four factors in Winter; the
public interest factor received most of the Court’s attention, while the
success on the merits factor was given passing treatment. In addition,
apart from the Ninth Circuit standard, the Court did not address other
circuit courts’ treatment of the success of the merits factor or its relation
to the other factors, and in particular to irreparable harm. The Court’s
uneven analysis of the factors, coupled with its silence on existing flexible preliminary injunction standards, has enabled many circuits to retain
their earlier standards. In particular, those circuits that allowed a lesser
showing of one factor when other factors were clearly demonstrated continue to apply a similar flexible preliminary injunction standard. For
these reasons, I also looked at trial courts’ treatment of the public interest
factor, the trump card in the Winter decision.
G. The Influence of the Public Interest Factor
Because the public interest factor was uniquely important to the
Winter decision, I singled out this factor for discussion. The final table,
Table 8, focuses on changes to trial courts’ analysis of the public interest
factor. In particular, I looked at whether the trial court (1) analyzed the
factor to determine the outcome of the injunction, (2) mentioned but did
not analyze the factor to determine the outcome of the injunction, or (3)
did not mention or analyze public interest factor to determine the outcome of the injunction.
Table 8: Post-Winter: Importance of Public Interest

Public Interest Factor
Analyzed
Mentioned, but Not
Analyzed
Not Mentioned or
Analyzed

Pre-Winter (33)308

Post-Winter (41)

24 (72.7%)

33 (80.5%)

3 (9.1%)

3 (7.3%)

5 (15%)

5 (12.2%)

308. One of the pre-Winter trial court decisions could not be located, and it was unclear from
the decision on appeal whether the trial court evaluated this factor. See case cited infra note 342 in
Appendix A.
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As the numbers show, there is a slight increase in the number of trial courts analyzing the public interest factor, and there is a slight decrease in the number of courts that do not mention or analyze this factor.
These numbers support the argument that in environmental cases, trial
courts are spending more time on the public interest factor post-Winter—
that Winter, in fact, gave teeth to the individual factors.309 A brief comparison of how trial courts evaluated the public interest before and after
Winter further illustrate this point. For example, in Northwest Ecosystem
Alliance v. Rey, a pre-Winter decision, the court described the preliminary injunction standard as “irreparable injury and inadequacy of legal
remedies.”310 The public interest was not enumerated as a factor to evaluate and the court merely mentioned that “[o]n balance, . . . the competing equities and the public interest weigh in favor of” the plaintiffs.311 In
that case, the injunction was granted.312
Compare that non-existent treatment of the public interest factor to
Confederate Tribes and Bands of Yakama Nation v. U.S. Department of
Agriculture, where the court stated the Winter standard and then evaluated each factor sequentially, first, second, third, and fourth.313 In discussing the public interest factor, the trial court began by stating, “Fourth, a
preliminary injunction is in the public interest.”314 The court went on to
weigh the harm of having baled garbage remain at the Honolulu port
against the harm of introducing invasive species from Hawaii to the
mainland.315
Before Winter, trial courts often did not fully analyze the public interest factor because that factor was often subsumed into the balance of
relative hardships.316 This lack of analysis was not always the courts’
fault. For example, in Defenders of Conewango Creek v. Echo Developers, LLC., the court noted the four traditional preliminary injunction factors.317 After addressing the first three factors, the court engaged in a

309. See Newman, supra note 149, at 350 (noting that post-Winter and eBay, courts are “giving
real teeth to the individual factors of the [preliminary injunction] test”).
310. Nw. Ecosystem v. Rey, No. 04–844P, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1846, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Jan.
9, 2006).
311. Id. at 18.
312. Id.
313. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakama Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. CV-103050-EFS, 2010 WL 3434091, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 30, 2010).
314. Id. at *5.
315. Id.
316. See, e.g., Caribbean Marine Serv., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 676–677 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the district court abused its discretion by ordering preliminary relief when it failed to
identify and weigh the public interests at stake).
317. No. 06-242 E, 2007 WL 3023927, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2007).
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weighing of the environmental harms against economic concerns.318 The
court simply noted that “general assertions [by the movant] about the
need to protect the environment and endangered species are unavailing to
achieve its end.”319
Post-Winter, courts are making a more concerted effort to analyze
the public interest factor. For example, in Hillsdale Environmental Loss
Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the plaintiffs sought to
enjoin the defendants from constructing a railyard under NEPA and the
CWA because a Section 404 CWA permit was granted without the completion of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).320 The U.S. District
Court for the District of Kansas determined that the plaintiff had not
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits or serious questions
going to the merits.321 The court stated that failure to satisfy the first factor under either standard was sufficient for the court to deny injunctive
relief.322 Instead of ending its analysis there, however, the court evaluated the balance of equities and the public interest.323 The court recognized
the public interests on both sides of the debate: compliance with federal
environmental statutes versus job growth, energy savings and congestion
relief.324 The economic benefit to the public was the stronger public interest however, and further supported the court’s decision to deny the
injunction.325
In addition to having a specific analysis of the public interest factor,
post-Winter orders include headings that highlight the analysis of each of
the factors.326 When addressing public interest, courts post-Winter more
clearly note the public interest competing with environmental concern.327
This is where the environmental plaintiffs’ concern becomes a reality.
Which public interest, environmental or economic concerns, deserves
greater weight? In Winter, the majority valued the public interest in military readiness above the public interest in preserving marine mammals.
By focusing its analysis on the public interest factor, the Supreme Court

318. Id. at *5.
319. Id.
320. Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10-CV-2008
CM/DJW, 2011 WL 3847383 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2011).
321. Id. at *2.
322. Id. at *3.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. See, e.g., W. Watersheds Project v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 774 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (D.
Nev. 2011), aff’d, 443 F. App’x 278 (9th Cir. 2011) (including four headings in the analysis section:
Likelihood of Success on the Merits, Irreparable Harm, Balancing the Equities, Public Interest).
327. Id. at 1103.
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has reenergized this factor, which often does not depend on what evidence is presented, but on what personal values a judge holds.
IV. ASSESSMENT: LOTS OF FORM AND LITTLE SUBSTANCE
What do these quantitative and qualitative analyses demonstrate?
First, numbers are not enough. Numbers show little change in environmental preliminary injunction standards pre- and post-Winter, but they
do not explain why there is little change. A textual analysis of trial and
circuit court opinions addressing preliminary injunction post-Winter better explains the quantitative data.
The textual analysis also shows that circuit courts are more likely to
try to reconcile their earlier circuit standard with Winter than overtly
state that a new standard applies. This is particularly true in circuits
where the flexibility arose in the first factor—success on the merits, and
the first factor was always evaluated. Pre-Winter, the Second, Third,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all had preliminary injunction
standards that in certain instances allowed the success on the merits factor to be modified. In these instances, success on the merits became “serious questions” on the merits or some variation thereof.328
These different iterations of the first factor can be summarized as
follows. In the Second Circuit, “serious questions” on the merits could
replace a “likelihood of success” on the merits, as long as the plaintiff
demonstrated both irreparable harm and a balance of hardships that
tipped in its favor. Similarly, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits allowed for
“serious questions” when the balance of hardships tipped in the movant’s
favor. “Questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult,
and doubtful” was also permissible in the Tenth Circuit when the movant
demonstrated that the remaining three factors—irreparable injury, balance of the injuries, and the public interest—“decidedly” tipped in its
favor. The Third and Seventh Circuit did not rename the first factor but,
instead, balanced all the factors against each other so that a strong showing of one factor could offset a weak showing of another. For the Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, success on the
merits was an important but flexible factor. Success on the merits did not
have to be strong or “likely” when the other factors weigh in the movant’s favor.
The Fourth Circuit standard has also been interpreted as being a
flexible standard, but there are two differences between the Fourth Circuit standard and the standards just reviewed and thus two possible explanations for why the Fourth Circuit post-Winter took a different ap328. See supra Part III.
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proach. One difference has to do with the order in which the factors are
addressed, and the other has to do with the passing reference to the final
factor—public interest. While these differences are subtle, they help explain the “fatal tension” the Fourth Circuit described in the Real Truth
About Obama.
The Fourth Circuit standard before Winter was commonly referred
to as the “Blackwelder balance-of-hardship test.”329 The focus of this
standard was on balancing the harms of the parties.330 Only when the
balance tipped in the movant’s favor would the court consider the success on the merits.331 This approach is different from the one taken by
other circuits and by the Court in Winter. The Fourth Circuit in Real
Truth About Obama interpreted the Winter standard to require all four
factors to be satisfied “as articulated,”332 devoid of some sequential test.
The Fourth Circuit before Winter also paid little attention to the final factor, public interest, which was an important, if not the most important,
factor to the Court in Winter.
When viewed this way, the Fourth Circuit was compelled to reach
an outcome different from other circuits and to overrule its pre-Winter
standard. Its unique approach was more difficult to reconcile with the
Winter four-factor standard. The Fourth Circuit, however, has little impact on the overall percentages of injunctions granted and denied because
of the small number of environmental preliminary injunction requests
this circuit reviews.
In those circuits with the greatest number of preliminary injunction
requests, earlier preliminary injunction standards continue today. The
Supreme Court’s silence on the first factor helps explain why these circuits have held either expressly or impliedly that their pre-Winter standards continue. In addition, the Court’s silence on how the factors relate to
one another has enabled courts to continue to balance the factors against
one another so that a weaker showing in one factor can be displaced by a
strong showing in another. Because these requests are reviewed in essentially the same manner post-Winter as they were pre-Winter, it is not sur-

329. See Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 194 (4th Cir. 1977).
330. See id. at 195–96 (expressing no opinion on the merits of the issues and noting that noting
that the “two more important factors” are irreparable injury to the plaintiff and likely harm to the
defendant).
331. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 890 F. Supp. 2d 688,
691 (S.D. W. Va. 2012) (emphasizing that “in Blackwelder, [the Fourth Circuit] instructed that the
likelihood-of-success requirement be considered, if at all, only after a balancing of hardships is
conducted . . . .”).
332. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir.
2009), overruled on other grounds by Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130
S. Ct. 2371 (2010).
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prising that there is little change in the number of injunctions granted or
denied.333
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court in Winter clearly stated the preliminary injunction standard in an environmental case as a four-factor test, it
did not explain the relationship of the four factors to each other. As a
result, most trial courts post-Winter have been able to apply an injunction
standard similar to the one they used pre-Winter, thereby preventing significant changes to the number of environmental injunctions issued at the
trial level.
In turn, the quantitative data suggests that Winter has not created a
stricter standard; the percentage of injunctions issued post-Winter is essentially the same as the pre-Winter percentage. The qualitative data also
suggests that Winter has not dramatically altered preliminary injunctions;
the preliminary injunction standards recited and used by the majority of
trial courts post-Winter are essentially the same as pre-Winter standards.
Circuit courts recognize the Winter standard at least in form but have
made efforts to keep all or some portion of their earlier flexible standards
in tack.
As expected, these findings complement each other. Because most
trial courts employ the same standard pre- and post-Winter, the number
of injunctions granted or denied pre- and post-Winter is similar, suggesting that Winter’s effect has been mild.
Perhaps Winter’s limited analysis and cursory approach was a good
thing. Circuit courts would have been unwilling or unable to retain earlier “flexible” standards had the Supreme Court addressed all of the factors or been more explicit in how these factors interrelate. For the time
being, Winter’s deficiencies are a blessing in disguise for the environmental plaintiff.334 The judicial landscape for environmental preliminary
injunctions remains relatively unchanged.335

333. A similar effect can be seen with eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006), a Supreme Court decision that altered the standard for permanent injunctive relief. See Stacy
Streur, The eBay Effect: Tougher Standards but Courts Return to the Prior Practice of Granting
Injunctions for Patent Infringement, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 67, 88 (2009) (noting that eBay
“has had a significant impact on the analytical process courts use to determine whether a patent
holder is entitled to an injunction” but “has not had a significant and lasting impact on the outcome
of those decisions”); see also Jedediah Wakefield & Sebastian E. Kaplan, Irreparable Harm, I Presume?, FENWICK & WEST LLP (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.fenwick.com/publications/Pages/Irrep
arable-Harm-I-Presume.aspx (concluding that “[t]he fears that eBay and Winter heralded the end of
injunctions in intellectual property cases have proven unfounded for trademark litigation”).
334. Brown & Fazio, supra note 192 (recognizing that Winter is not a “watershed moment in
environmental law” because the sliding scale remains intact); see also Love, supra note 192, at 712
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Appendix A: Pre-Winter Trial Court Decisions
Case Name

Food & Water
Watch, Inc. v. U.S.
Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 570 F.
Supp. 2d 177 (D.
Mass 2008)
Defs. of Wildlife v.
Hall, 565 F. Supp.
2d 1160 (D. Mont.
2008)
Lands Council v.
McNair, 2006 WL
5883202 (D. Idaho
Dec. 18, 2006)336
Alliance for the
Wild Rockies v.
Wood, 2008 WL
2152237 (D. Idaho
May 21, 2008)
Heartwood, Inc. v.
Peterson, 2008 WL
2151997 (E.D. Ky.
May 21, 2008)
Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land
Mgmt., 2008 WL
11946818 (D. Colo. Apr. 30, 2008)
Ocean Mammal
Inst. v. Gates, 546
F. Supp. 2d 960 (D.
Haw. 2008)

Circuit

Claim

Sliding
Scale or
Serious
Questions
No

Treatment of
Public
Interest

Preliminary
Injunction

Analyzed

Denied

First
Circuit

NEPA

Ninth
Circuit

ESA

Yes

Mentioned

Granted

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA,
NFMA

Yes

Analyzed

Denied

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA,
NFMA

Yes

Analyzed

Granted

Sixth Circuit

ESA

No

Analyzed

Denied

Tenth
Circuit

NEPA

Yes

Analyzed

Denied

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA,
CZMA,
NMSA

Yes

Analyzed

Granted
(NPEA &
CZMA),
Denied
(NMSA)

(describing the Ninth Circuit’s articulation of the “serious questions” sliding-scale test post-Winter
as a “godsend” for those who live and practice in the Ninth Circuit).
335. See Lawrence Hurley, Debate Continues over Impact of Supreme Court’s Whale Ruling
on Enviros’ Bid to Halt Projects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
gwire/2010/11/01/01greenwire-debate-continues-over-impact-of-supreme-courts-47696.html (quoting Susan Jane Brown, staff attorney at the Western Environmental Law Center, as stating that Winter “doesn’t reshape the judicial landscape”).
336. Affirmed by Ninth Circuit on July 2, 2008. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981 (9th
Cir. 2008).
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S. Utah Wilderness
Alliance v. Office
of Surface Mining
Reclamation &
Enforcement, 2007
WL 4300095 (D.
Utah Dec. 5, 2007)
Natural Res. Def.
Council v.
Kempthorne,
525 F. Supp. 2d
115 (D.D.C. 2007)
Berryessa for All v.
U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation,
2007 WL 4209551
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 27,
2007)
Protect Lake
Pleasant L.L.C. v.
Johnson, 2007 WL
1486869 (D. Ariz.
May 21, 2007)337
Sierra Nevada Forest Prot. Campaign
v. Rey, 2007 WL
3034931 (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 16, 2007)338
Defenders of
Conewango Creek
v. Echo Developers, L.L.C., 2007
WL 3023927
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 12,
2007)
Ohio Valley Envtl.
Coal. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs,
528 F. Supp. 2d
(S.D. W. Va. 2007)
Colo. Wild, Inc. v.
U.S. Forest Serv.,
523 F. Supp. 2d
1213 (D. Colo.
2007)

Tenth
Circuit

Surface
Mining
Control
and Reclamation
Act

Yes

Analyzed

Denied

D.C.
Circuit

Permits to
drill
violated
the APA
& NEPA
NEPA

Yes

Analyzed

Denied

Yes

Not
Mentioned

Denied

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA

Yes

Not
Mentioned

Denied

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA,
NFMA

Yes

Analyzed

Denied

Third
Circuit

CWA,
ESA

No

Analyzed

Denied

Fourth
Circuit

CWA,
NEPA

Yes

Analyzed

Granted

Tenth
Circuit

NEPA

Yes

Analyzed

Granted

Ninth
Circuit
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337. Affirmed on appeal in November 2007. Protect Lake Pleasant, LLC v. Johnson, 252 F.
App’x 856 (9th Cir. 2007).
338. Reversed and remanded post-Winter. 577 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2009).
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N. Plains Res.
Council v. U.S.
Bureau of Land
Mgmt., 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 25238
(D. Mont. Apr. 5,
2005)339
Friends of Magureewock, Inc. v.
U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 498 F.
Supp. 2d 365 (D.
Me. 2007)
Colo. Wild, Inc. v.
U.S. Forest Serv.,
2007 WL 1834029
(D. Colo. Apr. 25,
2007)
W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink,
2006 WL 2735772
(D. Idaho Sept. 25,
2006)
Geertson Farms,
Inc. v. Johanns,
2007 WL 776146
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 12,
2007)340
Nw. Bypass Grp v.
U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 470 F.
Supp. 2d 30 (D.
N.H. 2007)
Lands Council v.
McNair, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 98785
(D. Idaho Dec. 18,
2006)341
Fibermark N. Am.
Inc. v. Jackson,
2007 WL 4157235
(D. N.J. Mar. 28,
2007)
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Ninth
Circuit

NEPA

No

Analyzed

Granted

First
Circuit

CWA,
NEPA

No

Analyzed

Denied

Tenth
Circuit

NEPA

Yes

Analyzed

Granted

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA

Yes

Analyzed

Granted

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA

No

Not
Mentioned

Granted

First
Circuit

CWA,
NEPA,
NHPA

No

Analyzed

Denied

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA,
NFMA

Yes

Analyzed

Denied

Third
Circuit

CWA &
14th and
13th A.

Yes

Analyzed

Granted

339. Affirmed on appeal. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2007).
340. Permanent injunction granted May 3, 2007. Geertson Farms Inc. v. Johanns, No. C 0601075 CRB, 2007 WL 1302981 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2007), aff'd sub nom. Geertson Seed Farms v.
Johanns, 541 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2008), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, 570
F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130
S. Ct. 2743 (2010), aff'd sub nom. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 570 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009),
rev'd and remanded sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
341. Affirmed en banc. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Baykeeper v. U.S.
Army Corp of
Eng’rs, 2006 WL
2711547 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 20, 2006)
Cal. Oak Foundation v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 2006 WL
2454438 (E.D. Cal.
Aug. 23, 2006)
Blanco v. Burton,
2006 WL 2366046
(E.D. La. Aug. 14,
2006)

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA

Yes

Not
Mentioned

Granted

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA,
NFMA

No

Not
Mentioned

Granted

Fifth
Circuit

No

Analyzed

Denied
No IR

Natural Wildlife
Fed. v. Harvey,
820 F. Supp. 2d
1029 (E.D. Ark.
2008)
Earth Island Inst.
v. U.S. Army Corp
of Eng’rs342
Natural Res. Def.
Council v. U.S.
Army Corp of
Eng’rs, 457 F.
Supp. 2d 198
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)
Nw. Ecosystem
Alliance v. Rey,
2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1846 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 9, 2006)
Montrose Parkway
v. U.S. Army Corp
of Eng’rs, 405 F.
Supp. 2d 587 (D.
Md. 2005)
Anglers of the Au
Sable v. U.S. Forest Serv., 402 F.
Supp. 2d 826 (E.D.
Mich. 2005)
Sierra Club v.
Bosworth, 2005
WL 3096149 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 14, 2005)

Eighth
District

Outer continental
Shelf
Lands Act,
NEPA,
CZMA
NEPA
and ESA

No

Analyzed

Granted
(ESA)
Denied
(NEPA)

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA

Yes

Unclear

Denied

Second
Circuit

NEPA

No

Analyzed

Deniedavailable
remedy
remand

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA

No

Mentioned

Granted in
part and
denied in
part

Fourth
Circuit

NEPA,
CWA

No

Analyzed

Denied

Sixth
Circuit

NEPA,
NFMA,
MLA,
APA

Yes

Analyzed

Granted

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA

Yes

Mentioned

Granted

342. Reversed on appeal. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng’rs, 442 F.3d 1147 (9th
Cir. 2006).
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Appendix B: Post-Winter Trial Court Decisions
(Nov. 9, 2008–Nov. 8, 2011)
Name

Circuit

Claim

Sliding
Scale or
Serious
Questions

Treatment
of Public
Interest

Preliminary
Injunction (PI)

Which PI
standard?

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S.
Forest Serv.,
820 F. Supp.
2d 1029 (D.
Ariz. 2011)
Hillsdale Envtl.
Loss Prevention
v. U.S. Army
Corp of Eng’rs,
2011 WL
3847383 (D.
Kan. Aug. 26,
2011)
Friends of
Merrymeeting
Bay v. U.S.
Dep’t of Commerce, 810 F.
Supp. 2d 320
(D. Me. 2011)

Ninth
Circuit

ESA

No

Not
mentioned

Granted

Winter
mentioned,
but not
applied b/c
ESA case

Tenth
Circuit

NEPA,
CWA

Yes

Analyzed

Denied

Winter &
Circuit
Standard

First
Circuit

ESA

Yes

Analyzed

Denied

Circuit
Standard

W. Watersheds
Project v. Salazar, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
151556 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 10,
2011)
Phippsburg
Shellfish v. U.S.
Army Corp of
Eng’rs, 800 F.
Supp. 2d 312
(D. Me. 2011)

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA

Yes

Analyzed

Denied

Winter &
Circuit
Standard

First
Circuit

CWA,
NEPA

No

Analyzed

Denied

Winter &
Circuit
Standard
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Audubon Soc.
of Portland v.
Nat’l Marine
Fisheries
Serv., 849 F.
Supp. 2d 1017
(D. Ore. 2011)
Sierra Club v.
U.S. Army Corp
of Eng’rs343

Ninth
Circuit

ESA

Eighth
Circuit

CWA,
NEPA,
ESA

Or. Natural
Desert Ass’n v.
McDaniel,
2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 100815
(D. Ore. July
6, 2011) 344
Bair v. Cal.
Dep’t of
Transp., 2011
WL 2650896
(N.D. Cal. July
6, 2011)

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA,
FLPMA
&
Wilderness Act

Yes

[Vol. 37:155

Not
Mentioned

Denied

Ninth
Circuit

Not
Mentioned

Granted
in part

Winter and
Circuit
Standard

Yes

Analyzed

Granted

No standard

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA,
Yes
Dept. of
Trans.
Act, Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act,
APA

Analyzed

Granted

Winter and
Circuit
Standard

Wildlands v.
U.S. Forest
Serv., 791 F.
Supp. 2d 979
(D. Ore. 2011)

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA

Yes

Analyzed

Granted

Winter

Aquifer Guardians in Urban
Areas v. Fed.
Highway Admin., 779 F.
Supp. 2d 542
(W.D. Tex.
2011)

Fifth
Circuit

APA,
NEPA

No

Analyzed

Denied

Winter

343. I was unable to locate this trial court decision. The appellate decision however affirmed
the trial court’s decision to grant in part and deny in part the injunction. See Sierra Club v. U.S.
Army Corp of Eng’rs, 645 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2011).
344. Permanent injunction construed as a preliminary injunction.
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W. Watersheds
Project v. Bureau of Land
Mgmt., 774 F.
Supp. 2d 1089
(D. Nev.
2011)345
Conservation
Congress v.
U.S. Forest
Serv., 803 F.
Supp. 2d 1126
(E.D. Cal.
2011)346

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA

Yes

Analyzed

Denied

Winter

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA,
NFMA

Yes

Analyzed

Granted
in part,
denied
in part

Winter and
Circuit
Standard

Los Padres
Forestwatch v.
U.S. Forest
Serv., 776 F.
Supp. 2d 1042
(N.D. Cal.
2011)
Ctr. for Food
Safety v. Vilsack, 753 F.
Supp. 2d 1051
(N.D. Cal.
2010)347

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA

Yes

Analyzed

Granted

Winter and
Circuit
Standard

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA

No

Analyzed

Granted

Winter

Alliance for the
Wild Rockies v.
Cottrell348

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA,
NFMA

Yes

Analyzed

Denied

Winter and
Circuit
Standard

Quechan Tribe
v. U.S. Dep’t
of the Interior,
755 F. Supp.
2d 1104 (S.D.

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA,
NHPA,
FLPMA

Yes

Analyzed

Granted

Winter

345. Affirmed on appeal. See W. Watersheds Project. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 443 F. App’x
278 (9th Cir. 2011).
346. Affirmed on appeal. See Conservation Congress v. U.S. Forest Serv., 489 F. App’x 151
(9th Cir. 2012).
347. Reversed on appeal. See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2011).
348. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 622 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2010), reh’g
denied, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011) (withdrawing and replacing prior opinion on denial of rehearing en banc).
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Cal. 2010)
Michigan v.
U.S. Army
Corp of
Eng’rs, 2010
WL 5018559
(N.D. Ill. Dec.
2, 2010)
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Seventh
Circuit

Public
Nuisance

Yes

Analyzed

Denied

Winter and
Circuit
Standard

Am. Whitewater v. Tidwell, 2010 WL
5019879 (D.
S.C. Dec. 2,
2010)
Habitat for
Horses v. Salazar, 745 F.
Supp. 2d 438
(S.D.N.Y.
2010)

Fourth
Circuit

WRSA,
APA,
NEPA

No

Analyzed

Denied

Winter

Second
Circuit

Wild
Free
Roaming
Horses/Burr
os Act,
NEPA
&
FLPMA

Yes

Analyzed

Denied

Winter and
Circuit
Standard

Animal Welfare
Inst. v. Martin,
588 F. Supp. 2d
70 (D. Me.
2008)349
KlamathSiskiyou
Wildlands Ctr.
v. Grantham,
2010 WL
3958640 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 8,
2010)350

First
Circuit

ESA

No

Analyzed

Granted
in part

Winter and
Circuit
Standard

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA,
ARA,
NFMA

Yes

Mentioned

Denied

Winter and
Circuit
Standard

349. The permanent injunction on this matter was denied by the trial court and affirmed by the
First Circuit. Animal Welfare Inst. v. Martin, 668 F. Supp. 2d 254 (D. Me. 2009), aff’d, 623 F.3d 19
(1st Cir. 2010).
350. Affirmed on appeal. See Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Grantham, 424 F. App’x 635
(9th Cir. 2011).
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Confederated
Tribes &
Bands of
Yakama Nation
v. U.S. Dep’t
of Agric., 2010
WL 343409
(E.D. Wash.
Aug. 30, 2010)
In Def. of Animals v. U.S.
Dep’t of the
Interior, 737 F.
Supp. 2d 1125
(E.D. Cal.
2010)

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA,
NHPA,
and
others

Yes

Analyzed

Granted

Winter and
Circuit
Standard

Ninth
Circuit

Wild
Yes
Free
Roaming
Horses/Burros
Act,
NEPA

Analyzed

Denied

Winter and
Ninth Circuit

Appalachian
Voices v. Chu,
725 F. Supp.
2d 101 (D.D.C.
2011)
Consol. Delta
Smelt Cases,
717 F. Supp.
2d 1021 (E.D.
Cal. 2010)
City of Newburgh v. Sarna, 690 F.
Supp. 2d 136
(S.D.N.Y.
2010)351
Sierra Club v.
Clinton, 689 F.
Supp. 2d 1123
(D. Minn.
2010)
Del. Dep’t of
Natural Res. v.

D.C.
Circuit

NEPA,
ESA,
APA

No

Mentioned

Denied

Winter and
D.C. Circuit

Ninth
Circuit

ESA,
NEPA

No

Analyzed

Granted

Winter

Second
Circuit

CWA,
public
nuisance

No

Not
Mentioned

Denied

Winter and
Circuit
Standard

Eighth
Circuit

NEPA

Yes

Analyzed

Denied

Winter and
Circuit
Standard

Third
Circuit

CWA,
CAA,

No

Analyzed

Granted
in part,

Winter

351. Affirmed in part, dismissing appeal in part. City of Newburgh v. Sarna, 406 F. App’x 557
(2d Cir. 2011).
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U.S. Army
Corps of
Eng’rs, 681 F.
Supp. 2d 546
(D. Del. 2010)

CZMA

[Vol. 37:155
denied
in part

In Def. of Animals v. Salazar, 675 F.
Supp. 2d 89
(D.D.C. 2009)

D.C.
Circuit

Violation of
Wild
Horses
Act

Yes

Analyzed

Denied

Winter &
Circuit
Standard

S. Fork Band
Council of W.
Shoshone v.
U.S. Dep’t of
the Interior,
643 F.Supp.2d
1192 (D. Nev.
2009)352
League to Save
Lake Tahoe v.
Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 2009
WL 3048739
(E.D. Cal.
Sept. 18, 2009)
Def. of Wildlife
v. Salazar, 812
F. Supp. 2d
1205 (D.
Mont. 2009)
San Luis Valley Ecosystem
Council v. U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 657
F. Supp. 2d
1233 (D. Colo.
2009)

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA,
APA,
FLPMA

No

Analyzed

Denied

Winter

Ninth
Circuit

Tahoe
Regional Compact

No

Analyzed

Granted
in part

Winter

D.C.
Circuit

ESA

No

Analyzed

Denied

Winter

Tenth
Circuit

NEPA

Yes

Analyzed

Granted

Winter and
Circuit
Standard

352. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. S. Fork Band Council of W. Shoshone v. U.S. Dep’t
of the Interior, 588 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2009).
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Or. Natural
Desert Ass’n v.
Kimbell, 2009
WL 1663037
(D. Ore. June
15, 2009) 353
Greater Yellowstone Coal.
v. Timchak,
2008 WL
5101754 (D.
Idaho Nov. 26,
2008)354

Ninth
Circuit

ESA

No standard mentioned

Analyzed

Granted
in part

No standard
except Hill

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA,
CWA,
NFMA

Yes

Analyzed

Denied

Winter and
Circuit
Standard

City and Cnty.
of Honolulu v.
EPA, 2009 WL
855896 (D.
Haw. Mar. 27,
2009)

Ninth
Circuit

FIOA,
CWA

No

Mentioned

Denied

Winter

Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Salazar, 612 F.
Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2009)
Save Strawberry Canyon v.
Dep’t of Energy, 612 F.
Supp. 2d 117
(N.D. Cal.
2009)

D.D.
Circuit

NEPA,
APA,
ESA,
NWRS
AA,
NHPA

Yes

Analyzed

Granted

Winter and
Circuit
Standard

Ninth
Circuit

NEPA

Yes

Analyzed

Granted

Winter and
Circuit
Standard

Sierra Club v.
U.S. Forest
Serv., 593 F.
Supp. 2d 1306
(N.D. Ga.

Eleventh
Circuit

NEPA

No

Analyzed

Granted
in part

Winter

353. Vacated in part. Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Kimbell, No. 07-1871-HA, 2009 WL
1663037 (D. Ore. June 15, 2009).
354. Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded. Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Timchak,
323 F. App’x 512 (9th Cir. 2009).

220
2008)
Uranium
Watch v. U.S.
Forest Serv.,
2010 WL
3703807 (D.
Utah Sept. 14,
2010)

Seattle University Law Review

Tenth
Circuit

NEPA

No

Not
mentioned
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Denied

Circuit
Standard

